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I. INTRODUCTION
The Preamble to Indonesia's Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 ("the BAL")
states that the current land law of Indonesia is incompatible with the interests
of the people and the state, as it is based upon the objectives and principles
of the colonial government.' The Explanatory Memorandum expands on this
notion by explaining that the pluralism of colonial land law, in which diverse
customary (adat) laws existed alongside Western-style statutory law, is
inconsistent with nation-building and fails to provide legal certainty to
autochthonous Indonesians.' The BAL's stated objective, therefore, is to lay
the foundation for a national agrarian law that provides legal unity, simplicity,
and certainty to all Indonesians, and prosperity, happiness, and justice for the
nation and the people, including farming communities.' The BAL seeks to do
this in the syncretic way beloved by Indonesians: on the one hand, it converts
all existing statutory rights, and most adat rights, into a range of Western-
1. See Law No. 5, 1960 Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia 104 [hereinafter L.N.] (Sept. 24),
Undang Undang Pokok Agraria [Basic Principles of Agrarian Law] [hereinafter BALi (Indon.).
Independent Indonesia's attempt to formulate a postcolonial, national agrarian law began in 1948 (three
years after the Declaration of Independence but while the Dutch "police action" remained active) with the
formation of an agrarian committee by nationalists in Java. The committee's deliberations led to some
interim reforms of colonial agrarian law that particularly focused on the unlawful occupation of former
colonial private estates. However, consensus on the form and content of a national agrarian law was not
reached for another twelve years. This was largely due to disagreement over the role that customary law
and principles should play in creating national law and over whether a unified national law should be
created by rapid codification or by incremental judicial reform. See SUDARGO GAUTAMA & ROBERT N.
HORNICK, AN INTRODUCTION TO INDONESIAN LAW-UNITY IN DIvERsITY 79 (4th ed. 1983). For a
detailed discussion of these aspects of the legal unification debate in colonial and postcolonial Indonesia,
see Daniel Lev, The Lady and the Banyan Tree: Civil Law Change in Indonesia, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 282
(1965) [hereinafter Lev, The Lady]; Daniel Lev, The Supreme Court and Adat Inheritance Law in
Indonesia, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 205 (1962) [hereinafter Lev, Supreme Court].
2. See BAL, Explanatory Memorandum, General Elucidation, pt. I. For a discussion of the view that
colonial legal pluralism discriminated against autochthonous Indonesians, see GAUTAMA & HORNICK,
supra note 1, at 1; see also JOHN BALL, INDONESIAN LEGAL HISTORY: 1602-1848, at 226-27 (1982). As
to Van Vollenhoven and ter Haar's belief that some form of pluralism was necessary to protect the
interests of the diverse groups in Indonesian society, see B. TER HAAR, ADAT LAW IN INDONESIA 12-14
(A. Arthur Schiller & E. Adamson Hoebel eds. & George C.O. Haas & Margaret Hordyk trans., 1948);
see also Lev, The Lady, supra note 1, at 284; Lev, Supreme Court, supra note 1, at 206.
3. See BAL, Explanatory Memorandum, General Elucidation, pt. I.
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style, registrable land rights; on the other hand, it explains that these rights
are based upon adat law and have a social function that emphasizes the needs
of the community over those of the individual.
Thirty-six years later, it is apparent that the BAL's objectives of legal
unity and certainty have not been attained and will not be attained in the
foreseeable future. The Indonesian government estimates that no more than
twenty percent of all registrable land, and only ten percent in rural areas, has
been registered under the BAL.4 The number and severity of disputes over
land have increased dramatically.' Large tracts of newly settled areas, both
urban and rural, now exist without the certainties that established adat
authority or the BAL can provide.' The courts have allowed a vaguely
defined principle of "development" to override purportedly mandatory
legislative requirements. 7 In short, a new and even more uncertain form of
pluralism has arisen in postcolonial Indonesian land law and administration.
This Article analyzes the causes and nature of this new pluralism. It
argues that, in practice, the BAL is not a syncretic amalgam of Western and
adat principles but instead operates contrary to adat, particularly in its
imposition of Western-style, individualized land titles on customary forms of
tenure. This inconsistency with adat has two fundamental consequences. First,
the process of registering titles under the BAL itself creates long-term
disputation and social conflict, and, for that reason, is highly unlikely to fulfill
its objective of legal certainty. Second, the BAL's failure to provide legal
certainty, in combination with the erosion or subjugation of adat authority in
many areas, has created a dangerous legal vacuum and allowed ad hoc
bureaucratic fiat to dominate the administration and development of land in
Indonesia.
Part II of this Article explores these arguments by analyzing modern
Indonesia's failure to attain unified land law under the BAL. After a brief
discussion of the colonial legacy of legal pluralism, it considers the nature of
adat and adat land law. It then outlines the scheme of the BAL, in particular
its purported amalgamation of adat principles with Western-style statutory
rights. The efficacy of this approach is first tested by reference to the
treatment of communal adat titles under the BAL. This exercise establishes
that the BAL's adat features have not counteracted its Western-style
individualizing tendencies; that adat and the BAL are incompatible, and that,
for this reason, the process of registering titles under the BAL will create
conflict rather than certainty. These conclusions are supported by case studies
of title registration disputes in the regions of Minangkabau and Ambon. They
are then used to criticize current Indonesian and World Bank programs to
accelerate the process of title registration in Indonesia, a particular problem
with these programs being that the adjudication committee contains no
members drawn from traditional adat authority.
4. See Land Agency To Review Rule on Holding Size, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 12, 1993, at 2.
5. See Land-Love Strong Among Villagers, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 15, 1995, at 1; cf. Land-for-Land
Solution Proposed, JAKARTA POST, May 9, 1995, at 1 (discussing House Speaker's suggestions for
protecting people from displacement from land).
6. See infra Section nll.B.
7. See infra Section mI.D.
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Part III considers the high levels of conflict, uncertainty, and inequitable
development that characterize the new pluralism in Indonesian land law. It
begins by analyzing three aspects of this uncertainty: first, the disassociation
of adat practice from state law; second, the erosion of adat authority in Java
and urban areas; and third, the widespread phenomenon of unlawful
occupancy. Taken together, these three contemporary phenomena have
resulted in a significant increase in land conflicts in modern Indonesia.
Part IV goes on to consider the way in which the BAL has helped to
engender a vicious cycle in the process of development in Indonesia. The
defining feature of this cycle is that both developers and the bureaucracy
eschew the uncertainties of dealing with unregistered adat titles in favor of
acquiring land at below-market price through arbitrary application (or
sometimes nonapplication) of the laws on land acquisition. This phenomenon,
and the role of the courts in allowing it, is illustrated by an extensive
consideration of the Kedung Ombo Dam Case and the Sentani Airport Case.
The Kedung Ombo Dam Case also illustrates the perverse way in which the
BAL's incorporation of adat principles (in particular, the notion that rights to
land have a social function) has been used to justify failure to comply with the
laws on land acquisition. In this way, the Article comes full circle: It shows
that, in the context of rapid economic development, the current conflict-ridden
and inequitable state of Indonesian land law and administration is inseparable
from flaws in the structure and application of the BAL itself.
The Article concludes with an outline of reforms that would address many
of these issues. The proposed reforms include a recommendation that the
BAL's ill-fated attempt at incorporating adat principles into formal law be
repealed. Instead of amalgamating adat with the state, the replacement should
create appropriate links between the two, with the objective being a balanced
dualism between them, rather than the present hegemony of state and
bureaucracy. This would be done, in part, by providing a range of registration
choices that would reflect the tremendous regional diversity in Indonesia and
by creating a separate and independent Land Court to deal with the central
issue of dispute resolution.
I. THE FAILURE OF UNIFICATION
A. The Colonial Heritage of Legal Pluralism
The foundation of Holland's pluralistic legal legacy to Indonesia was its
private law distinctions among "Europeans," "Native Indonesians," and
"Foreign Orientals."8 "Europeans" were subject to civil and commercial
codes imported from Holland in 1848. Autochthonous Indonesians were
governed by their various adat laws and by a small number of colonial
8. See GAUTAMA & HORNICK, supra note 1, at 2-14 (discussing definitions of "European," "Native
Indonesian," and "Foreign Oriental" used in colonial private law and way in which members of one group
could change their legal status to that of another group). These distinctions remain valid in modem
Indonesia by virtue of the transitional provisions of the 1945 Constitution. See INDON. CONST.
(Constitution of 1945) art. II (Transitional Provisions); GAUTAMA & HORNICK, supra.
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regulations expressly made applicable to them. 9 "Foreign Orientals" were
also governed by their own customary law until their participation in the
colonial economy led the Dutch administration to apply the Civil and
Commercial Codes to them.' 0 Upon independence, Indonesia adopted this
legal pluralism pending the development of laws better suited to a modern,
independent nation."
Thus it was that,, prior to the passage of the BAL in 1960, Indonesian
land law remained governed by two separate and distinct bodies of law. The
first was known as "Western land law," as it was regulated by the Civil Code
and included a system of hierarchical rights ranging from ownership
(eigendom) to lease (erfpacht) and use (gebruik). ' The second was adat law,
the nature of which will be considered below. This division of law led, in
turn, to a distinction between "Western land" and "Indonesian land." 3
Western land was land subject to Western land rights, but it could be held by
foreigners, autochthonous Indonesians, and the "Oriental Group" alike.
14
Indonesian land was subject either to adat rights or to the special "native"
proprietary right known as agrarische eigendom.15 From 1870 to 1875, it
could be leased or purchased by nonautochthonous Indonesians. 6 From
1875, however, alienation to nonnatives of land held under adat rights was
significantly restricted.'
7
9. See GAUTAMA & HORNICK, supra note 1, at 9.
10. "Chinese Orientals" became subject to almost all of the Civil and Commercial Codes in 1917.
"Non-Chinese Orientals" became subject to the Codes in 1925, save in relation to family law and intestate
succession, where customary law continued to apply. See id. at 12-14.
11. See INDON. CONST. (Constitution of 1945) art. II (Transitional Provisions).
12. See GAUTAMA & HORNICK, supra note 1, at 77. Eigendom was unlimited in time and gave the
power to sell, give, or otherwise dispose of the land. See id. (discussing INDON. Civ. CODE arts.
570-672). Erfpacht was a right in another's land that gave all the incidents of ownership save that it was
limited in time, and activities that might reduce the land's value could not be undertaken on it. See id. at
78 (discussing INDON. Civ. CODE arts. 720-36). Gebruik was a right of use in another's land, of limited
duration, which could be held by natural persons only, and was able to be transferred, leased, or
mortgaged. See id. (discussing INDON. CIV. CODE arts. 818-29).
13. It is estimated that less than five percent of land in Indonesia was classified as Western land. See
COLIN MACANDREWS, LAND POLICY IN MODERN INDONESIA 20 (1986). There were also small areas of
registered "Chinese land," which was land subject to the special "Oriental" land right known as landerijen
bezitsrecht. This was a statutory right of ownership in former private estate land allowed to Chinese and
Foreign Orientals. See GAUTAMA & HORNICK, supra note 1, at 71-72 (discussing Royal Decree No. 45,
1913 Staatsblad 702 [hereinafter S.] (Oct. 22) (Indon.)).
14. See SUDARGO GAUTAMA & BUDI HARSONO, SURVEY OF INDONESIAN ECONOMIC LAW:
AGRARIAN LAW at vii-viii (1972). Professor Gautama is one of Indonesia's leading lawyers. Budi Harsono
is currently Minister for Agrarian Affairs and is Indonesia's preeminent commentator on Indonesian land
law.
15. See GAUTAMA & HORNICK, supra note 1, at 71. Agrarische eigendom was a statutory right of
ownership in "Indonesian" land in Java and Madura that could be created through the conversion of
individually held adat "ownership" rights. See id.
16. See GAUTAMA & HARSONO, supra note 14, at viii.
17. See GAUTAMA & HONICK, supra note 1, at 72 (discussing Ordinance, 1875 S. 179 (Aug. 4)
(Indon.)). However, nonnatives could still obtain adat rights to Indonesian land through inheritance or
mixed marriages. See id.
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B. The Nature of Adat
1. Regional Diversity in Indonesian Adat
A brief survey of the tremendous regional variation in Indonesian society
shows that the concept of the Indonesian adat is an elusive one. 8 In some
areas, such as Hindu Bali and the matrilineal (but Islamic) Minangkabau of
West Sumatra, adat rules are quite detailed, sometimes written, and exhibit
such a high degree of predictability, application, and adherence that they take
on many of the characteristics of "law."' 9 In other societies, such as those
of the shifting cultivators of Kalimantan and Irian Jaya and the subsistence
farmers of Eastern Indonesia, adat is unwritten and exhibits itself in patterns
of traditional ritual and kinship relations rather than prescriptive rules and
maxims.2 0 In Aceh, the most Islamic of Indonesian provinces, an interesting
syncretic combination of the predominant Islamic culture and remnant
matrilinealism may be discerned. 2 Among the Batak of North Sumatra, a
number of oral maxims, of varying prescriptive content, are derived largely
from the dictates of a patrilineal and exogamous subclan structure, and then
distilled through a formal process of consensual decisionmaking known as
runggun.z In Java, a fundamental divide exists between "santri" Muslims,
who place strong, monotheistic emphasis on the centrality of religious doctrine
in social relations, and the more populous "abangan" Muslims, who
syncretize pantheistic animism with Hindu and Islamic beliefs.'
18. See generally Hildred Geertz, Indonesian Cultures and Communities, in INDONESIA 24, 24-96
(R. McVey ed., 1967) (documenting disparate conceptions of adat).
19. For a description of the detailed nature of community rules (awig-awig) in Bali, see CAROL
WARREN, ADAT AND DINAS: BALINESE COMMUNITIES IN THE INDONESIAN STATE 11-13 (1993). For a
discussion of the "innumerable" proverbs and sayings in Minangkabau adat rules, see FRANZ VON BENDA-
BECKMANN, PROPERTY IN SOCIAL CONTINUITY: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF
PROPERTY RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH TIME IN MINANGKABAU, WEST SUMATRA 114 (1979).
20. See, e.g., WILLIAM CONLEY, THE KALIMANTAN KENYAH: A STUDY OF TRIBAL CONVERSION
IN TERMS OF DYNAMIC CULTURAL THEMES 69-70 (1976); 1 ETHNIC GROUPS OF INSULAR SOUTHEAST
ASIA 147-97 (Frank LeBar ed., 1972); CARL HOFFMAN, THE PUNAN: HUNTERS AND GATHERERS OF
BORNEO 36, 47 (1986).
21. The remnant matrilinealism in Aceh may be seen in the custom that upon marriage a man must
move into his wife's home, which is built by her parents in the family compound. See CORNELIS VAN
HOLLEMAN, VAN VOLLENHOVEN ON INDONESIAN ADAT LAW 79 (J.F. Holleman ed., 1981). The author's
personal experience in Aceh is that this custom remains very strong.
22. See MASRI SINGARIMBUN, KINSHIP, DESCENT AND ALLIANCE AMONG THE KARO BATAK (1975);
see also E.M. LOEB, SUMATRA: ITS HISTORY AND PEOPLE 74-81 (1972); Herman Slaats & Karen Portier,
Legal Plurality and the Transformation of Normative Concepts in the Process of Litigation in Karo Batak
Society, in ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS 217, 218-22 (Keebet von Benda-Beckmann
& Fons Strijbosch eds., 1986).
23. See KARL D. JACKSON, TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY, ISLAM, AND REBELLION 78 (1980); C.
Geertz, Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example, 59 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 35-37 (1957). A
similar version of syncretist Islam may be found among the Sasaks of Lombok. See SVEN CEDERROTH,
THE SPELL OF THE ANCESTORS AND THE POWER OF MEKKAH 2, 86-88 (1981). President Suharto is
regarded as an abangan Muslim and is said to consult soothsayers and family spirits regularly. More
recently, however, he has been forced to seek support from santri Muslims as his support among a new
generation of army officers has diminished. See ADAM SCHwARZ, A NATION IN WAITING 171 (1994)
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2. Universal Principles of Adat
Despite this diversity, it is generally argued by anthropologists and the
Leiden school of Dutch adat scholars that certain universal principles underpin
the operation of all local adat rules.24 Of these, the most fundamental is the
emphasis that adat places on maintaining an appropriate equilibrium (rukun)
among individuals, the community, and the cosmos.' This emphasis on
equilibrium arises out of an intense interaction between the living and the
spirit worlds in traditional Indonesian societies.26 Rituals are seen as
particularly central to maintaining the protection of natural and ancestral
spirits against personal and communal misfortune.27 This focus on ritual and
cosmology fosters a very strong sense of communal solidarity, which is
underpinned by kinship relations and a magico-religious identification with
land.2 Thus, another universal principle is identified in adat, namely, that
collective interests outweigh those of the individual.29 Together, these
principles of equilibrium and collective unity are said to reflect adat's
fundamental role in balancing such basic oppositional forces in Indonesian
society as rights and obligations, egalitarian and hierarchic tendencies, and
24. See Peter Burns, The Myth of Adat, 28 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 1-29 (1989) (discussing Leiden
school's belief in universal adat principles).
25. Warren puts it well: "Village adat is basically about the ordering of relationships-human,
material and spiritual-in a system where cosmic and social forces cannot be divorced." WARREN, supra
note 19, at 38.
26. Although it is impossible to cover the great variety of such beliefs throughout Indonesia, some
discussions offer a representative analysis. For a description of the interaction between living and spirit
worlds among the Karo Batak of North Sumatra, see SINGARIMBUN, supra note 22, at 21-29. As to the
belief of the Dou Donggo of Eastern Sumbawa that social and kinship relations encompass both the dead
and the unborn, see generally Peter Just, Dou Donggo Social Organisation: Ideology, Structure, and
Action in an Indonesian Society (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on
file with author). As to the rich pantheistic and anthropomorphic cosmology of the sedentary Dayaks of
Kalimantan and the way in which this is maintained by complicated rituals and ceremonies, see ETHNIC
GROUPS OF INSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA, supra note 20, at 147-97. For a general examination of the
overriding supernaturalism among the Kalimantan Kenyah, see CONLEY, supra note 20, at 45-153. For
a description of the intense interaction between living and spirit worlds among the Tetum, see DAVID
MICKS, A MATERNAL RELIGION: THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN TETUM MYTH AND RITUAL 90 (Monograph
Series on Southeast Asia, Ctr. for Southeast Asian Studies, N. Ill. Univ., Special Report No. 22, 1984).
For a description of the relationship between Javanese abangan Muslims and the spirit world (including
spirits in the banyan tree in the village square), see JACKSON, supra note 23, at 78. As to the extremely
powerful cosmological beliefs of the Balinese, see WARREN, supra note 19, at 38-39.
27. For example, the Karo Batak sustain the protection of archetypal male and female spirits known
as Pa Megoh and Nande Megoh through ceremony and ritual. See SINGARIMBUN, supra note 22, at 21.
Failure to observe taboos and deference to elders among the Dou Donggo of Eastern Sumbawa leads to
the loss of protection of benevolent spirits. See Just, supra note 26, at 234. Birth, death, marriage, and
circumcision rituals are fundamental to preventing misfortune among Javanese abangan Muslims. See
JACKSON, supra note 23, at 78. Rituals and ceremonies form the basis of community welfare in traditional
Balinese life. See WARREN, supra note 19, at 139-63.
28. See KOENTJARANINGRAT, VILLAGES IN INDONESIA 253 (1967) (providing anthropological studies
showing powerful connection between land and magico-religious social structure in Indonesia); see also
LEONTINE E. VISSER, MY RICE FIELD IS MY CHILD: SOCIAL AND TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF SWIDDEN
CULTIVATION IN SAHU, EASTERN INDONESIA 103-05, 123-24 (1989); TOBY ALICE VOLKmAN, FEASTS
OF HONOR: RITUAL AND CHANGE IN THE TORAJA HIGHLANDS 49-50 (1985); WARREN, supra note 19,
at 36-42.
29. See MICHAEL BARRY HOOKER, ADAT LAW IN MODERN INDONESIA 55 (1978). Of course, the
strength of this principle will vary from region to region.
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territorial and kinship loyalties.30
In part, adat's emphasis on equilibrium and collective unity may be
ascribed to the relative absence in Indonesian societies of Western-style,
hierarchical, and self-validating decisionmaking processes. Ultimately,
however, the notions of equilibrium and collective unity are inseparable from
the pervasive mysticism in Indonesian society. In Eastern Indonesia, in
particular, maintaining the harmony of oppositional forces is regarded as
essential for the spiritual health not only of the community but also of the
world as a whole.32 Even in Western Indonesia, where Islam has put down
stronger roots, legends of disaster following social and religious imbalance
remain highly influential. 33 This mysticism may be attributed to a number of
sources, including the strong influence of Hinduism and Hindu myths,34 the
proselytizing of a flexible and syncretic form of Islam by Sufi missionaries,35
and animist reverence for the ancestral dead and their burial places. 36
3. Is Adat "Law"?
A recurring theme in adat literature, made relevant here by the BAL's
incorporation of adat concepts into formal law, is the extent to which adat is
"law" as opposed to mere custom. A positivist analysis would say that,
whereas some adat is concerned with maintaining cosmological and communal
equilibrium, other adat is concerned with restoring it; therefore, the latter is
"law" because it involves some form of sanction.37 But, to the average
Indonesian villager, the question of penalty is never independent of the
ultimate goal of cosmological equilibrium.3 Because the processes by which
this equilibrium is achieved are fluid and result-oriented and because the
sanction of adat is interwoven with cosmological beliefs and territorial or
30. See id. at 33-48; see also HILDRED GEERTZ & CLIFFORD GEERTZ, KINSHIP IN BALI 168 (1975)
(discussing forces in Bali that oppose yet balance one another). For a discussion of equilibrium and
dualism in Eastern Indonesia, see James J. Fox, Category and Complement: Binary Ideologies and the
Organisation of Dualism in Eastern Indonesia, in THE A'TrRACTION OF OPPOSITES: THOUGHT AND
SOCIETY IN THE DUALjSTIC MODE 33, 51-53 (David Maybury-Lewis & Uri Almagor eds., 1989)
(discussing equilibrium and dualism in Eastern Indonesia).
31. See SUSAN BOLYARD MILLAR, BUGIS 'WEDDINGS: RITUALS OF SOCIAL LOCATION IN MODERN
INDONESIA 34-35 (Monograph Series, Ctr. for South and Southeast Asian Studies, U.C. Berkeley,
Monograph No. 29, 1989) (analyzing absence of formal authority and way in which informal authority
is garnered over time through personal appeal and ideology among Bugis of South Sulawesi).
32. See GEERTZ & GEERTZ, supra note 30, at 167.
33. This influence is demonstrated by the manner in which the Suharto government considered the
unusual step of charging a prominent Javanese soothsayer with subversion-which is punishable by
death-for prophesying that violence and disorder would characterize the last years of the Suharto regime,
See NU Enters Fray in Support of Permadi, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 13, 1995, at 1.
34. See M.C. HOADLEY & M.B. HOOKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JAVANESE LAW: A TRANSLATION
OF AND COMMENTARY ON THE AGAMA 12, 15-29 (1981).
35. See HOOKER, supra note 29, at 91.
36. See WARREN, supra note 19, at 37.
37. See, e.g., John Griffiths, Recent Anthropology of Law in the Netherlands and Its Historical
Background, in ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 22, at 11, 20 (analyzing Van
Vollenhoven's view that adat law could be distinguished from adat by presence of sanction).
38. For an excellent discussion of this proposition from a contemporary Indonesian scholar, see JOHN
SALINDEHO, MASALAH TANAH DALAM PEMBANGUNAN [THE PROBLEM OF LAND WITHIN DEVELOPMENT]
154, 259-61 (1988); see also VON BENDA-BECKMANN, supra note 19, at 116-18.
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kinship loyalties, no simple distinction can be drawn between adat and adat
law.
39
One consequence of this is that adat resists analysis based on Western
notions of enforceable "rights" and "obligations." Instead, the regulation of
adat communities, and the interaction of those communities with other adat
groups, rests squarely on traditional processes of deliberation and consensus
(mufakat and musyarawat) and mutual assistance (gotong royong).40 These
processes are identified as universal adat principles and viewed as national
characteristics.41 In some societies, they involve formal institutions of
consensual decisionmaking.42 In most societies, however, they are informal
requirements that are instrumental to balancing oppositional forces in society,
particularly to serve the principles of equilibrium and collective unity
discussed above.
An important point derived from this analysis of adat is that, to the extent
that there are universal adat principles, they are so embedded in local social
structure, and so lacking in Western-style legal predictability and consistency,
that it is difficult to see how they can be incorporated into formal law,
particularly in the context of a patrimonial state bent on rapid economic
development.43 This argument is further illustrated below through an analysis
of the BAL in practice. First, however, it is necessary to make a related
point: Although adat derives from traditional village or kinship
communities,' it is not necessarily defined or circumscribed by them.
39. See SAUNDEHO, supra note 38, at 254-61; cf. HOOKER, supra note 29, at 145-51 (illustrating
"difficulties in the application of concepts from Western jurisprudence to [non-Western] ethnography").
40. Indeed, it is fundamental to adat that these adat processes are far more significant than "rights"
per se. See HOOKER, supra note 29, at 28; Daniel Lev, Judicial Institutions and Legal Culture in
Indonesia, in CULTURE AND POLITICS IN INDONESIA 246, 283-84 (Clare Holt ed., 1972); cf. MOHAMMED
KOESNOE, REPORT CONCERNING A CO-OPERATIVE RESEARCH OF ADAT LAW ON THE ISLANDS OF BALI
AND LOMBOK 65-67, 96 (1978) (asserting that "aim of any study into Adat law [is] to know how ... the
decisions are related to the structure of communing life and the values of working in it"). As to the
fundamental influence of social structure on the nature of legal "rules," see generally HOOKER, supra note
29, at 149-51. For a Balinese case study, see Danker H. Schaareman, Context and the Interpretation of
Adat Rules in Bali, in ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 22, at 195-217.
41. This process is important for many groups in Indonesia. See Herman Slaats and Karen Portier,
Some Notes on Administering Justice in Karo-Land North Sumatra, in BEYOND SAMOSIR: RECENT STUDIES
OF THE BATAK PEOPLES OF SUMATRA (R. Smith Kipp & R. Kipp eds., 1983) (discussing importance of
these processes in Karo Batak law in North Sumatra); G. van den Steenhoven, Musjawarah in Karo-land,
7 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 693, 693-718 (1973); see also VON BENDA-BECKMANN, supra note 19, at 92, 117
(discussing central role of these processes in Mingangkabau adat).
42. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 22 (discussing runggun procedure in Karo Batak
society).
43. At first glance, this analysis seems inconsistent with Dworkin's proposition that legal rules can
only be derived from underlying community morality. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 256 (1986).
The classic example of this principle in the common law is the notion that the right to recover in
negligence is derived from the Christian principle of "love thy neighbor." See Donoghue v. Stevenson,
1932 App. Cas. 562, 580 (appeal taken from Scot.). However, this Article seeks to show that in the
context of a patrimonial, development-oriented state, lacking an independent judiciary and governing
through an oligarchic alliance of army, commercial interests, and bureaucracy, the process of transforming
community (adat) morality into formal law has not occurred. In fact, the state in contemporary Indonesia
has subverted the whole process by using it to give legal legitimacy to the ad hoe exercise of executive
power. See infra Subsection III.D.2.
44. Jural communities in Indonesia are delineated either on territorial or on genealogical lines, and
sometimes on a combination of the two. See HOOKER, supra note 29, at 34-41; TER HAAR, supra note
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Modem anthropologists tend to eschew the deification of autonomous adat
villages by colonial scholars in favor of recognizing the complex interaction
of kinship groups, hierarchical obligations, territorial loyalties, religious
bodies, agricultural associations, and external influences in ordinary adat
life." For present purposes, the relevant consequence of this view is that
adat principles may continue as a system of shared values, and a network of
relationships, notwithstanding that discrete, semi-autonomous villages no
longer exist in a particular area. This point is relevant both to the erosion of
adat authority in many areas of modem Indonesia and to the question of
reform. It is also further considered below.
C. The Nature of Adat Land Law
1. The Community Right of Control Known as Hak Ulayat
Although applying Western legal terminology to Indonesia is
inadequate,46 it is nevertheless convenient for the purposes of this Article to
describe the relationship between adat and land in terms of "law," "rights,"
and "obligations." Thus one can say that adat land law recognizes a number
of individual rights to land, including rights to possess, use, harvest, pledge,
lease, and priority to buy.47 The nature and strength of these rights vary
from region to region.48 They are most common in urban areas and in Java,
but far less prevalent in West Sumatra, Bali, Kalimantan, and Irian Jaya.
Their strength also depends on where the land to which they relate is situated.
Individual rights are less likely to be subject to communal control when they
exist in agricultural fields not subject to wet rice-farming.49 Communal
controls are more likely to exist in situations involving wet rice-farming,
village housing, and religious land.
Traditionally, these community controls over individual rights are said to
2, at 49-74.
45. See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTz, NEGARA: THE THEATRE STATE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY BALI
47-48 (1980); WARREN, supra note 19, at 1; J. Breman, The Village in Java and the Early Colonial State,
J. PEASANT STUD., July 1982, at 189-240.
46. The inappropriateness of applying Western terminology to Indonesian adat has been well
described. See TER HAAR, supra note 2, at 224-28 (discussing inexact correlation with Dutch Indonesian
terminology); 1 THE LAWS OF SOUTH EAST ASIA 3 (M.B. Hooker ed., 1988). But cf John Griffiths, The
Division of Labour in Social Control, in TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 37, 37-38
(Donald Black ed., 1984) (critiquing approaches that regard law as being "a folk concept, suitable only
for use within an internal perspective by the participants in a given system" of social control).
47. Rights to possess are generally available only to community members; outsiders gain rights of
use only, for which they must pay recognition money (recognitie). Pledges are the basic form of adat
security. The right of priority to buy is generally available only to neighbors. See SALINDEHO, supra note
38, at 276; see also TER HAAR, supra note 2, at 95-97 (discussing nature of individual possessory rights).
48. For example, in Aceh, clearing and cultivating virgin land (that is, uncultivated lands outside the
agricultural fields-padang-surrounding a village) leads to individual rights of ownership subject only to
community rights of grazing in a noncrop season and neighbors' rights of first option to purchase. In
Central and East Java, individuals may hold short term usufructuary rights to cultivate, but these are
predicated on observance of adat rules, including community rights to graze animals when land is fallow.
In Minangkabau, temporary, noninheritable cultivation rights are allocated to individual subclan members
from larger subelan-held usufructuary rights. See VAN HOLLEMAN, supra note 21, at 97-98, 150, 138.
49. Wet rice-farming requires a great deal of community cooperation, particularly in irrigation.
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be embodied in the overarching community right of disposal known by Dutch
scholars as bescchikkingsrecht and by Indonesian lawyers as hak ulayat.
50
Hak ulayat has two basic features.51 The first is the way in which the
relationship between an individual community member's right to land and the
community's right of disposal turns on an ebb and flow of commitment and
obligation. That is to say, the more work and capital that an individual puts
into a piece of land, the greater the community's recognition of the
individual's particular right to it;52 the less work put into a piece of land by
an individual, the more likely that the community will exercise its overarching
right to reallocate the land for another member's use. 3
The second feature is that the transfer of rights, whether to outsiders or
between individual community members, is subject to strict community
control. At most, outsiders can obtain limited rights of use to land only with
50. Van Vollenhoven first coined the description "right of disposal" (bescchikkingsrecht) in his text
MISKENNINGEN VAN HET ADATRECHT 19ff (1909), cited in TER HAAR, supra note 2, at 81. The term hak
ulayat is used in the Minangkabau region of West Sumatra; different terms are used in other areas. For
a listing of terms used in other regions, see SALINDEHO, supra note 38, at 277; TER HAAR, supra note 2,
at 91. This Article uses the term hak ulayat as a compendious reference to the community right of
disposal, but the degree of parity between the various terms similar in meaning to hak ulayat needs to be
treated with some caution. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 24, at 95-97. For example, the study by Koesnoe
of Lombok adat law concluded that hak ulayat as defined by Van Vollenhoven did not in fact exist on that
island. See KOESNOE, supra note 40, at 87. Similarly, Vargas's study of the shifting cultivation adat law
of the Dayak of Kalimantan concluded that not all of the elements of hak ulayat, again, as defined by Van
Vollenhoven, were satisfied by the community's right of disposal known in the village of Jonggon. See
Donna Mayo Vargas, The Interface of Customary and National Land Law in East Kalimantan, Indonesia
128-29 (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author).
51. See GAUTAMA & HORNICK, supra note 1, at 73-74; VAN HOLLEMAN, supra note 21, at 180.
For a detailed account of Van Vollenhoven's development of the notion of an archipelago-wide community
right of disposal, see Burns, supra note 24, at 8-29.
52. The acquisition of adat rights to land echoes Lockean theory, particularly Locke's argument that
individuals acquire certain natural rights in property to which they have committed labor or capital. See
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GoVERNMENT285-302 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988)
(1690). However, adat's vision of the proper function of government and civil institutions differs from
Locke's. Locke believed that social institutions existed to protect the natural property rights of individuals;
in contrast, traditional adat considers that individual property rights are not so much inherent and natural,
but rather flow from the community's recognition that an individual has expended labor on a piece of land.
In other words, although there are elements of natural rights philosophy in adat, ultimately adat "rights"
are socially constructed and do not possess a natural inviolability. This understanding supports this
Article's argument that, in the context of contemporary Indonesia, amalgamating adat principles into
formal law is fraught with difficulty. See Walton H. Hamilton, Property According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J.
864 (1932) (discussing inviolability in Lockean notions of property).
53. See Maria Rita Ruwiastuti, Hak Ulayat Masyarakat Hukum Adat [Community Right of Disposal,
Community Customary Law] 5 (1988) (unpublished mimeograph, Kerjasama Pendidikan Hukum
Masyarakat) (on file with author); see also SAUNDEHO, supra note 38, at 282; TER HAAR, supra note 2,
at 81-84. Another tempting parallel between adat and Western legal thought is in the common law's
emphasis on possession as the basis of ownership. See F.W. Maitland, The Mystery of Seisin, 2 LAW Q.
REV. 481 (1886). In the common law, taking lawful possession of land imparts rights to that land that may
only be extinguished by the owner or by abandonment. See F.W. Maitland, The Beatitude of Seisin, 4
LAW Q. REV. 286, 290, 299 (1888). A similar situation may be posited in adat if the community is viewed
as having ultimate ownership or sovereignty in local lands. This could explain why an occupier's rights
can be extinguished by an adat community. However, this is an imperfect comparison. First, unlike in the
common law, the adat community "owner" does not have a general right to extinguish individual
possessory rights in land subject only to the passing of time. Instead, the community can only extinguish
such "rights" in the event of abandonment or other serious adat wrongs. Second, and more fundamentally,
the interaction between a community and its members in adat is far more fluid and complex than can be
adequately explained by a common law rights analysis.
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the consent of the community and on the payment of "recognition money"
(recognitie). Similarly, community members generally can only acquire rights
to land from other community members with the consent of the community or
its heads.M
Colonial scholars considered that hak ulayat existed throughout the
archipelago, save for the islands of Flores and Banggai. 5 The extent to
which hak ulayat persists in modem times has not been the subject of
systematic research.56 There is some recent evidence that it continues to exist
in places as disparate as Aceh,17 Ambon,55  West Sumatra,59 and Irian
Jaya.' However, one Indonesian commentator states that it has ceased to
exist in Madura, Bawean, and the wet ricefields (sawah) of Bali.6 It also
appears largely to have disappeared in urban areas and many parts of Java.
The consequences of this erosion of hak ulayat are considered further below.
2. Other Communal Rights
Hak ulayat apart, individual rights to use or possess adat lands are also
commonly subject to obligations to provide voluntary labor to the
community,62 communal rights of free passage and grazing in noncrop
seasons, communal rights to excise land or redivide fields to accommodate
an increased population,' 4 communal restrictions on changes of use, and
neighbors' rights of first option to purchase in the event of alienation." In
some areas, maintenance of adat rights to land is also tied to performance of
fundamental ritual and ceremonial obligations.66
54. See Ruwiastuti, supra note 53, at 5; TER HAAR, supra note 2, at 86-88. As to the inalienability
of the traditional Javanese right to cultivate communal land, see Erman Rajagukguk, Agrarian Law, Land
Tenure and Subsistence in Java: Case Study of the Villages of Sukoharjo and Medayu 132-33 (1988)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with author) (discussing Judgment of
Oct. 10, 1956 (Desa Sukorejo v. Kasim), Dec. No. 32K/Sip/1956 (Indon.) (upholding customary rule that
communal land could only be used by village residents)).
55. See TER HAAR, supra note 2, at 82; cf. Bums, supra note 24, at 7 (arguing that it is inaccurate
to describe variety of communal rights to land in Indonesia in terms of archipelago-wide right of disposal).
56. See H. Darmawi, Land Transactions Under Indonesian Adat Law, 3 LAWASIA 283, 283-85
(1972).
57. See T.I. El Hakimy, Land Ownership in Rural Areas in Aceh (At the Village of Leupung in
Greater Aceh District) 30-32 (1980) (unpublished mimeograph, Syiah Kuala University, Darussalam,
Banda Aceh) (on file with author).
58. See Franz von Benda-Beckmann & Tanya Taale, Land, Trees and Houses: Changing
(Un)Certainties in Property Relationships on Ambon, Paper Presented at Northern Territory University
(1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
59. See vON BENDA-BECKMANN, supra note 19, at 147; Herman Sihombing, Preparing Indonesia's
National Civil Law Which Is Based on Adat Law (1980) (unpublished mimeograph, University of Andalas,
Padang) (on file with author).
60. See Rajagukguk, supra note 54, at 59-60.
61. See SALINDEHO, supra note 38, at 284-85.
62. See M. SUASTHAWA, STATUS DAN FUNGSI TANAH ADAT BALI [THE STATUS AND FUNCTION OF
CUSTOMARY BALINESE LAND LAW] 41 (1987) (discussing examples from Bali); Rajagukguk, supra note
54, at 123 (providing examples from Java).
63. See VAN HOLLEMAN, supra note 21, at 186.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 186-87.
66. See WARREN, supra note 19, at 42-44.
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D. The BAL
1. Unification
The BAL seeks to achieve its objectives of legal unity and certainty by
converting all Western rights, and most adat rights, into a range of new
statutory rights as of September 24, 1960. Thus, the BAL right of ownership
known as hak milik subsumes: a) the Western eigendom right of ownership,
the native proprietary right of agrarische eigendom, and the Oriental right of
landerijen bezitsrecht;67 b) adat rights equatable to ownership, such as hak
atas druwe, yasan, andarbeni, and pesini, as well as "other rights resembling
these";6" and c) the adat possessory rights of gogolan, pekulen and sanggan,
"and other rights resembling these," so long as they have "a permanent
quality.
69
Where these possessory rights do not have "a permanent quality," they
are subsumed by the statutory right of use known as hak pakai.70 Hak pakai
also subsumes Western rights of use, such as vrechtgebruik and gebruik,71
and other usufructuary adat rights including annggaduh, bengkok, lungguh,
and pitugas.72
2. Western Characteristics of the BAL
The new rights established by the BAL are Western in nature.73 Thus,
hak milik is unlimited in time and capable of being registered,74
transferred,75 and mortgaged.7 6 It is the "strongest and fullest" right to land
67. See BAL, Conversion Provisions, arts. 1, 2.
68. See id. arts. 2, 7. Hak atas druve desa is a Balinese right of ownership discussed in the BAL.
Yasan is a Javanese individual right of ownership sometimes subject to a prohibition on alienability. See
Rajagukguk, supra note 54, at 52.
69. See BAL, art. 7. Gogolan is the Javanese right of permanent use based on cultivation; pekulen
and sanggan are Javanese rights to use communal lands. See Rajagukguk, supra note 54, at 123, 134, 136.
A curious feature of the conversion ofpeklden is that pre-BAL court decisions confirmed it as a right that
reverts to the village when its holder dies. See id. at 22, 133 (discussing Judgment of the Supreme Court
(Darmosewojo v. Brotodirjo), Dec. No. 340 K/Sip/1959 (Indon.) (holding that father's land reverted to
village rather than to heirs after his death)). Therefore, it is difficult to see how it can ever be of a
permanent quality.
70. See BAL, art. 7. The Minister of Agrarian Affairs is to resolve any uncertainty as to whether
goggolan, pekulen, and sanggan rights in question are temporary or permanent. See id. art. 7, para. 3.
The statutory right of use is a right to use another's land for a fixed period of time, usually for the
purposes of agriculture or building. It may not be sold or otherwise transferred. See Rajagukguk, supra
note 54, at 55 n.102.
71. See BAL, art. 6. For the incidents ofgebruik, see supra note 12.
72. See BAL, art. 6. Anggaduh is a tenancy of arable land granted in return for a loan of money;
bengkok is a right of use granted to village officials; lungguh is an apanage granted to imperial officials
of Mataram. See VAN HOLLEMAN, supra note 21, at 191; Rajagukguk, supra note 54, at 128. Finally,
the BAL right of commercial exploitation known as hak guna usaha subsumes Western rights of
commercial lease (such as erfpacht) and concession (hak konsesi). The right to use buildings known as hak
guna bangunan takes the place of Western lease rights over houses (opstal and erfpacht). See id. at 56.
73. See Mary F. Hiscock & David F. Allan, Law Modernization in South-East Asia, 46
RABELszEITscHRIFT 509, 526 (1982).
74. See BAL, arts. 19, 23; see also Government Regulation No. 10, 1961 L.N. 28 (Mar. 23)
(Indon.) (concerning land registration).
75. See BAL, arts. 20, para. 2, 24, 27, 49, para. 3.
76. See id. art. 25.
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under the BAL," and may be the source, therefore, of secondary rights such
as use (hak pakai),78  building (hak guna bangunan),79  and lease (hak
sewa). 0 Only Indonesian nationals 8' and corporate bodies sanctioned by the
state may hold hak milik.82 Similarly, the BAL rights of exploitation (hak
guna usaha), use, and building are also capable of being registered,8"
transferred,' and, save for the right of use, mortgaged.8" These rights are
limited to Indonesian nationals, foreigners, and corporate bodies sanctioned
by the state.
8 6
Registration of rights under the BAL is conducted through a combination
of systematic and sporadic arrangements."7 Systematic registration is in the
process of being conducted from village to village by committees made up of
local officials.88 Sporadic (or voluntary) registration may be made at any
time, but is mandatory whenever a registrable title is the subject of
"transfer."
89
3. Adat Features of the BAL
With the notable exception of Hooker, 9' most commentators state that
these "Western" attributes of the BAL's rights are offset by a number of adat-
77. See id. art. 20, para. 1.
78. See id. arts. 41, para. 1, 43, para. 2.
79. See id. art. 37, para. 2.
80. See id. arts. 44, 53.
81. See id. arts. 9, paras. 1-2, 21.
82. These bodies do not include adat communities. The government came closest to allowing
registration of adat community rights in 1961 when it allowed certain corporate bodies, including "social
organizations" approved by the Minister of Agrarian Affairs in consultation with the Minister of Social
Welfare, to register ownership rights. An adat village or kinship grouping may be such an appropriate
social organization; however, it appears that neither ever has been approved as such.
83. See BAL, arts. 32, 38. Rights to use on state land must be registered in accordance with
Regulation of the Minister of Agrarian Affairs No. 1 of Jan. 5, 1966 (lndon.). Rights of use on privately
owned land need not be registered; however, they may be noted on the certificate of title. See Government
Regulation No. 10, 1961 L.N. 28 (Mar. 23) (Indon.) (concerning land registration).
84. See BAL, arts. 28, para. 3, 35, para. 3, 41, 43.
85. See id. arts. 35, 39, 57.
86. See id. arts. 30, 36, 42.
87. The system of registration is governed principally by Government Regulation No. 10, 1961 L.N.
28 (Mar. 23) (Indon.) (concerning land registration). However, a number of other regulations are also
relevant. See Regulation of the Minister of Agrarian Affairs No. 2, 1960 Tambahan Lembalan Negara
2086 [hereinafter T.L.N.] (Oct. 19) (Indon.); Decree of the Minister of Internal Affairs of May 14, 1970,
No. Sk 26/DDA/1970 (Indon.); Presidential Decree No. 32 (1980) (Indon.). The registration process has
two parts: First, hak milik and subsidiary rights are registered; second, a certificate of title is issued. For
the sake of convenience, this Article uses the term "registration" as a compendious reference to both of
these processes.
88. The committee determines the boundaries of particular land-holdings, the nature of rights to that
land, and the identity of the holders of those rights. Any disputes concerning the matters covered by the
registration map are to be settled, in the first instance, by conciliation under the supervision of the
committee. If the dispute remains unresolved after conciliation, the parties are advised to submit the matter
to the courts. See GAUT'AMA & HARsONO, supra note 14, at 93.
89. See BAL, art. 19. For an analysis of Government Regulation Number 10 that enacted parts of
this aspect of the BAL, see GAUTAMA & HORNICK, supra note 1, at 92-100. Transfer in this context
appears to include transfer by inheritance. See id. at 46-47. However, a failure to register does not
invalidate the transaction itself. See id. at 53-55.
90. See HOOKER, supra note 29, at 22, 117-20.
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based features of the BAL.91 One such feature is the somewhat curious
statement in the Explanatory Memorandum that the BAL's rights are "based
upon adat." Another is the statement in article 6 that all rights to land have
a "social function." 9 This concept is said to reflect principles of adat
law, 93 in particular, the notion discussed above that "rights" to land are
always constrained by the needs and processes of local groups.94 The
practical effect on modem Indonesian land law and administration of this
formal adoption of the social function principle is considered below.' 5
Another important notion is the statement in the Explanatory Memorandum
that the new land law of Indonesia arising out of the BAL will be "based on
adat law." 96 The truth of this proposition is considered below.
Essentially, these adat features of the BAL draw upon the colonial view
of ter Haar and Van Vollenhoven that unification of Indonesian law would be
possible only if it were based on universal adat principles distilled from long
and careful study of adat rules. 97 Thus, leading Indonesian commentators
interpret the BAL as retaining, in the long term, many general principles of
adat, but not necessarily diverse local adat rules. 9 However, this position
is complicated, at least in the short term, by article 5 of the BAL, which
states that adat land law is "the agrarian law of Indonesia" insofar as it is
consistent with national unity, the interests of the state, and the provisions of
the BAL itself.99 This appears to mean that local adat rules will remain valid
91. See, e.g., GAUTAMA & HARSONO, supra note 14, at 23; BOEDi HARSONO, HUKUM AGRARIA
INDONESIA [INDONESIAN AGRARIAN LAW] 2 (5th ed. 1994); MAcANDREWS, supra note 13, at 75; A.P.
PARLINDUNGAN, KOMENTAR ATAS UNDANG UNDANG POKOK AGRARIA [COMMENTARY ON THE BAL] 51
(1993); SALINDEHO, supra note 38, at 239.
92. This statement also appears in article 33 of the 1945 Constitution. INDON. CONST. (Constitution
of 1945) art. 33.
93. See PARLINDUNGAN, supra note 91, at 59-63. However, the use of the phrase "social function"
derives from a series of lectures by Leon Duguit in 1911, in which he argued that the notion of property
ownership was not the subjective right of the owner but the social function of the holder of wealth. It is
notable that Duguit particularly emphasized the obligation of holders of land to increase the general wealth
by making their land productive. See LEON DUGUIT, LAS TRANSFORMACIONES GENERALES DEL DERECHO
PRIVADO DESDE EL CODIGO DE NAPOLEON [GENERAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE PRIVATE LAW SINCE
THE NAPOLEONIC CODE] 141 (1912), cited in ROBERT CASAD & ROGELIO MONTAGNE, EXPROPRIATION
IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND PANAMA: PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES 2-3 (1975). For a discussion of the
large amount of land left vacant in Indonesia for speculative purposes, see infra note 171 and
accompanying text.
94. The concept of social function is interpreted in the Explanatory Memorandum to mean that
individual rights must be balanced against the interests of the community. See BAL, Explanatory
Memorandum, General Elucidation, pt. II, para. 4; see also R. Supomo, The Future of Adat Law in the
Reconstruction of Indonesia, in SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE COMING WORLD 217, 231 (Philip W. Thayer
ed., 1957) ("Above all, the right of ownership should not be understood in a Western liberalistic sense,
but the social function must be primarily emphasised in accordance with adat concepts.").
95. See infra Subsection II.D.1.
96. GAUTAMA & HARSONO, supra note 14, at 24.
97. See Lev, The Lady, supra note 1, at 284 n.3; see also Burns, supra note 24, at 9 (arguing that
this view was romanticized and that no genuinely universal adat principles exist, at least none sufficiently
concrete to found legal unification); supra note 43 and accompanying text.
98. See GAUTAMA & HARSONO, supra note 14, at 24.
99. See BAL, art. 5; see also HOOKER, supra note 29, at 114-24; infra Part II. This provision
generally reflects the post-Independence approach to unification of Indonesian law, namely that it "must
be based on adat law which does not hamper the promotion of a just and prosperous society." Statement
of the Indonesian Provisional People's Congress (MPRS No. 11/1960), quoted in HOOKER, supra note 29,
at 27.
186 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 22: 171
until the underlying rights are registered, so long as the interests of national
unity and the state do not dictate otherwise. In sum, the BAL purports to base
itself on universal adat principles, including the principle that rights to land
have a social function, and retains local adat rules only to the extent that they
are consistent with registered titles, national unity, and the interests of the
state.
E. Communal Rights Under the BAL
1. Hak Ulayat
One way to test the BAL's assertion that modern Indonesian land law is
to be "based on adat principles" is to consider the position of communal
rights under the BAL. Significantly, hak ulayat is not converted into a
statutory right. Article 3 states that it and "other rights resembling it" are
recognized where they continue to exist, but that they must be adjusted to
conform to the national interest.100
Subsequent government policy has taken this notion to the extreme by
treating all uncultivated hak ulayat land as land belonging to the state.' 0'
The legal bases for this "state hak ulayat" policy are article 33(3) of the 1945
Constitution and article 3 of the BAL, both of which declare all land in
Indonesia to be under the "control" of the state.'" 2 Even though the
Explanatory Memorandum expressly states that article 3 is not intended to
replicate the colonial "domain theory," under which the Dutch Crown was
said to own all land that was not eigendom or agrarische eigendom land, 3
the notion of state hak ulayat has enabled the state to grant rights to
uncultivated hak ulayat land without obtaining the consent of the relevant local
community and without triggering the legal obligation to pay "adequate"
compensation to holders of expropriated titles."° This practice has occurred
100. See BAL, art. 3. In a similar vein, the Explanatory Memorandum suggests that hak ulayat has
been an obstacle to regional development in the past. See id. Explanatory Memorandum, General
Elucidation, pt. II, para. 3.
101. See Ruwiastuti, supra note 53, at 2-3; see also MACANDREWS, supra note 13, at 27;
Rajagukguk, supra note 54, at 53-54; Sihombing, supra note 59, at 13-14.
102. See INDON. CONST. (Constitution of 1945) art. 33, para. 3; BAL, art. 3; see also BOEDI
HARSONO, UNDANG UNDANG POKOK AGRARIA [THE BASIC AGRARIAN LAW] 166-69 (3d ed. 1970);
Robert Homick, Indonesian Mortgage Lmv, 5 LAWASIA 30, 33 (1974); Ruwiastuti, supra note 53, at 3.
This policy is said to leave the traditional distributional role of the village chief in the hands of the
President. See id. at 3.
103. See BAL, Explanatory Memorandum, General Elucidation, pt. II. This included hak ulayat
land, although ownership may have been more formalistic than actual. See KEEBET VON BENDA-
BECKMANN, THE BROKEN STAIRWAYS TO CONSENSUS: VILLAGE JUSTICE AND STATE COURTS IN
MINANGKABAU 163 (1984). For a more extensive discussion of the domain theory, see GAUTAMA &
HORNICK, supra note 1, at 79-81; MICHAEL BARRY HOOKER, A CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY OF SOUTH-
EAST ASIA 188 (1978).
104. See BAL, art. 18; see also Law No. 20, 1961 L.N. 288, arts. 3, 5 (Sept. 26) (Indon.) (on
release of title); infra Subsection IlI.D.1 (discussing Kedung Ombo Dam Case). Indeed, many aspects of
the current operation of "state hak ulayat" echo the colonial infringements of hak ulayat so derided by Van
Vollenhoven. See Bums, supra note 24, at 19-32.
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most notably in relation to the granting of timber concessions," 5 the
declaration of protected state forests,0 6 and the allocation of land for
transmigration projects.0 7 Not surprisingly, it has given rise to a number
of disputes as adat conceptions of rights to hak ulayat land have clashed with
those of formal state law.1
08
2. Other Communal Rights
Hak ulayat and its equivalents aside, the BAL does convert some
traditional communal interests in land into statutory rights. For example, the
Balinese village right of ownership (hak atas druwe desa) and the
Minangkabau subclan right of use (ganggam bantuak) are converted
respectively into statutory rights of ownership and use. 09 Equivalent
communal adat rights are impliedly converted into appropriate statutory rights
by virtue of the compendious references to "other rights resembling these" in
the conversion provisions. In these circumstances, one might expect the
government to have instituted some mechanism through which jural
communities could register communal rights. However, the state has never
formally provided for registration of this kind, whether in the name of the
community or in the name of representatives or trustees. 10 Nor has the state
105. See Government RegulationNo. 21, art. 6, para. 3 (1970) (Indon.) ("[l]n an area where logging
operations are being conducted within the scope of forest utilisation, the implementation of community
rights to extract forest products shall be suspended."), translated in Marcus Colchester, The Struggle for
Land: Tribal Peoples in the Face of the Transmigration Programme, ECOLOGIST No. 2/3, 1986, at 105.
For a discussion of these issues and an outline of the environmental and economic benefits of recognizing
local community rights in forest concession areas, see generally CHARLES ZERNER, LEGAL OPTIONS FOR
THE INDONESIAN FORESTRY SECTOR (Ministry of Forestry Field Doc. No. V1-4, 1990).
106. See Basic Forestry Law, art. 17 (1967) (Indon.) ("Implementation of community rights,
customary law.., should not hinder the fulfillment of the aims referred to in this law."), translated in
Colchester, supra note 105, at 105; see also Government Regulation No. 21, art. 6, para. 1 (1970)
(Indon.) ("Rights of customary law communities and its members to extract forest products... shall be
arranged in a proper order so as not to interfere with implementation of forest utilisation."), translated
in Colchester, supra note 105, at 105.
107. See Basic Forestry Law: Clarification Act No. 2823, art. 17 (1967) (Indon.), translated in
Colchester, supra note 105, at 105 ("The rights of traditional law communities may not be allowed to
stand in the way of the establishment of Transmigration settlements.").
108. See MACANDREWS, supra note 13, at 58, 85; Sihombing, supra note 59, at 18-19. A typical
example is the reported refusal of the Parbuluhan village in the Dairi Regency of North Sumatra to accept
expropriation of its hak ulayat land for a commercial plantation. The land in question was named after the
clan that inhabited it, and was perceived to be holy. See Land-Love Strong Among Villagers, JAKARTA
POST, Mar. 15, 1995, at 1. An example of a transmigration dispute over hak ulayat land in Irian Jaya may
be found in reports of the Skou tribe's discontent with the Rp 130,000,000 (approximately U.S. $65,000)
recognition money offered by the state for the use of almost 100,000 hectares of traditionally held tropical
forest for transmigration purposes. See George J. Aditjondro, Transmigration in Irian Jaya: Issues, Targets
and Alternative Approaches, PRISMA, Sept. 1986, at 72-73. For further details of transmigration disputes
in Irian Jaya, see Colchester, supra note 105, at 99. For an example of a conflict between hak ulayat and
a state logging concession, see Land Dispute of the Dayak Bentian, Indigenous People ofEast Kalimantan,
3 INDON. Hum. RTs. F. 19 (1992).
109. See BAL, Conversion Provisions, arts. 2, para. 1, 6.
110. See Interview with Lecturers in Land Law, at Udayana University, in Bali, Indonesia (Feb. 11,
1995); Interview with Bapak Bhudiawan, Lecturer in Land Law at Udayana University (Feb. 1, 1995)
(notes on file with author). In addition, no Indonesian or English language text known to the author
mentions the existence of any provision for registering statutory rights in the name of a traditional
community or family group. For texts not referred to specifically in other parts of this Article, see H.
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issued guidelines on associated issues, such as the rights of representatives or
trustees, the legal status of lists of community members, or the resolution of
intra-community disputes."'
F. The Incompatibility of Adat and the BAL
1. In General
The Western nature of the BAL's rights, the unregistrability of hak
ulayat, and the inability to register other communal rights all suggest that the
BAL, at least as currently applied, is ultimately directed at the
individualization of land tenure in Indonesia."' Many view such an
imposition of Western-style tenure as a precondition for economic
development.1 3 Some even claim that it is consistent with human rights.' 14
But it is clear that adat land law is cognizable only in the context of
communal rights and obligations, which are underpinned by social processes
ABDURRAHMAN, KEDUDUKAN HUKUM ADAT DALAM PERUNDANGAN-UNDANGAN AGRARIA INDONESIA
[THE POSITION OF ADAT LAW IN INDONESIAN AGRARIAN LEGISLATION] (1994); SUDARGO GAUTAMA,
TAFSIRAN UNDANG UNDANG POKOK AGRARIA [COMMENTARY ON THE BALI (9th ed. 1993); G.
KARTASAPOETRA ET AL., HUKUM TANAH [LAND LAW] (2d ed. 1991).
111. For a detailed discussion of the problems and requirements of registering customary communal
titles, see JACK KNETSCH & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, LAND POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 35-40 (Institute of Nat'l Affairs Discussion Paper No. 6, 1981). For a discussion
of the way in which communally held titles are registered in Lagos, Nigeria, see S.R. SIMPSON, LAND
LAW & REGISTRATION 230-33 (1976).
112. See HOOKER, supra note 29, at 118-20. It will be argued below, see infra notes 217-23 and
accompanying text, that this process has not been counteracted by adat features of the BAL such as the
principle of social function. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. For a useful discussion of a similar
use of statutory law to hasten or induce individualization of land tenure in Kenya, see HOOKER, supra note
29 at 200.
113. See MACANDREWS, supra note 13, at 75; SIMPSON, supra note 111, at 226 (suggesting that in
certain "circumstances it may prove necessary to replace customary law rather than wait for it to evolve").
These views owe an intellectual debt to the "tragedy of the commons" thesis, which holds that community
ownership of resources leads to their unsustainable depletion. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 3 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); see also RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32-35 (4th
ed. 1977) (discussing tragedy of commons thesis). This Article does not make an empirical contribution
to this debate. However, it does assert that in relation to agrarian law, tragedy of the commons proponents
fail to take into account the social dislocation and disputation that inevitably follow the imposition of
individualized, registered titles on communally oriented, customary tenure. In addition, imposing individual
titles on traditional communal tenure has the effect of bifurcating local practice and state law, which
creates forum-shopping opportunities for parties to disputes and enhances the possibility of exploitative,
state-backed development by outsiders contrary to the wishes of the local community. See infra Section
III.A.
Finally, those who argue that communal ownership of resources leads to their unsustainable depletion
fail to appreciate Indonesians' powerful cosmological beliefs, particularly their notion of equilibrium.
These beliefs generate social cohesion, which helps prevent excessive depletion of resources by individual
community members. Indeed, several other case studies suggest that this social cohesion actually
encourages sustainable use of natural resources. See, e.g., David L. Miller, The Evolution of Mexico's
Spiny Lobster Fishery, in COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: ECOLOGY AND COMMUNITY-BASED
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 185, 185-204 (Fikret Berkes ed., 1989); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711 (1986); Kenneth
Ruddle, Solving the Common-Property Dilemma: Village Fisheries Rights in Japanese Coastal Waters,
in COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: ECOLOGY AND COMMUNITY-BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
supra, at 168, 168-84.
114. See, e.g., SALINDEHO, supra note 38, at 287.
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of consensus, discussion, and deliberation. Individualizing and "freezing"
tenure through a process of registering Western-style rights threatens to break
down this subtle interaction between individuals and their community.115 In
doing so, individual registration of land also threatens traditional village social
structure itself, at least to the extent that this structure is based on communal
and cooperative elements. As a result, rather than conferring legal unity and
certainty, the registration of rights under the BAL is far more likely to lead
to disputation,'16 de facto pluralism, and ultimately the erosion of adat
authority itself. This erosion will only accelerate as land acquires increased
economic value under the pressures of industrialization, urbanization, and
population growth." 7
Notably, these unfortunate consequences have been identified in most
developing countries that have sought to impose registered, individualized
titles on customary, communal forms of tenure.I" In other words, where the
land law on which title registrations are based is inconsistent with social
reality, the much-touted benefit of registration-increased certainty that leads
to increased investment and access to formal credit-does not materialize.
Instead, registration engenders conflict and bifurcates local practice and state
law." 9 In turn, this bifurcation generates a vicious developmental cycle in
which economic activity is neither instigated by local communities nor
negotiated through them.2 0 Instead, it is imposed from above in an ad hoc
and discriminatory way by an alliance of bureaucracy and private commercial
interests.
115. For a case study of title registration in Papua New Guinea and an assertion that the costs of
social disruption may outweigh the benefits of registering individualized titles, see KNETSCN &
TREBILCOCK, supra note 111, at 32-33. For a critique of the notion that traditional law is a barrier to
development, see Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Scape-Goat and Magic Charm: Law in Development Theory
and Practice, 28 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 129 (1989). For a general discussion of the incompatibility of
customary law and individualized Western-style land law, see SIMPSON, supra note 111, at 224. Of course,
it may be that over time adat property relationships will evolve in a way that better reflects the property
concepts of Western law. See Franz von Benda-Beckmann & Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Property,
Politics, and Conflict: Ambon and Minangkabau Compared, 28 LAW & Soc'y REV. 589 (1994).
116. In Papua New Guinea, for example, there were attempts from 1965 to 1970 to register
systematically lands held under customary communal title with the assistance of demarcation committees
composed of local landowners and leaders. These attempts failed largely because of disputes engendered
by different groups fearing a freezing of claims. See KNETSCH & TREBILCOCK, supra note 111, at 10.
117. Simpson notes, for example, that the growth of individual dealing in customary land in Africa
has led to prolonged litigation and much uncertainty, largely because the communal nature of rights to land
operates as a very effective form of social insurance. He also notes that experiences in India, Burma, and
the United States have shown that conferring rights of alienability on customary titleholders has led many
to lose their traditional lands. See SIMPSON, supra note 111, at 236.
118. There are a number of countries that have faced these issues. See, e.g., KNETSC- &
TREBILCOCK, supra note 111, at 10-11, 34-40 (analyzing Papua New Guinea); David A. Atwood, Land
Registration in Africa: The Impact on Agricultural Production, 18 WORLD DEV. 659 (1990); R. A. Cramb
& I. R. Wills, The Role of Traditional Institutions in Rural Development: Community-Based Land Tenure
and Government Land Policy in Sarawak, Malaysia, 18 WORLD DEV. 347 (1990).
The only country that appears to have avoided these problems is Thailand, which, unlike Indonesia,
had a long history of land titling, a well developed and settled law, and little remaining traditional tenure
in nonforest areas. See A. F. Burns, Land Titling-The Big Picture, Paper Presented at Land Titling and
Land Administration Regional Workshop, Bali, Indonesia (Nov. 11-12, 1993) 14-15 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
119. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
120. See infra Subsection III.D.2.
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2. Registration Case Studies
The conflict created by title registration in customary land may be
illustrated by Sihombing's account of attempts to register the ganggam
bantuak right in the Minangkabau region"' As noted above, the BAL
expressly converted this usufructuary adat right into a statutory right of
use.' This right is held communally by traditional subclans under the
supervision of the chief heir (mamak kepala waris). The death of a subclan
member who has worked a particular piece of land does not lead to
inheritance of the right to use that land by his or her heirs; instead, the right
to allocate use remains in the hands of the subclan at all times. Minangkabau
subclans have sought to overcome the lack of formal provision for registration
of communal rights by allowing chief heirs to register ganggam bantuak land
in their own names, while also enclosing a list of all the subclan's members
in the registration papers. Sihombing reports, however, that subclan members
have sometimes challenged these registrations, especially when their own
names are omitted from the list of members. A notable aspect of these
omissions is that they have tended to favor the immediate family of the chief
heir at the expense of the subclan itself, thereby reflecting the Minangkabau's
own general but contentious trend toward nuclear family affiliation.2I
This example suggests that the process of registration itself tends to
sharpen and define social conflict. 24 A further example of this phenomenon
is provided by Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Tanja Taale in their study of
the village of Hila in Ambon.'1 The village governing council in Hila
asserts a general community right of disposal over all uncultivated land in the
higher parts of its territory. However, patrilineal clans in Hila, whose adat
authority predates that of the council, claim some areas of this land
exclusively for themselves. These competing claims are complicated further
by the fact that planted crops on land are inherited bilaterally, while the land
and wild trees on it are inherited patrilineally. As a result, crops and even
individual trees may be owned by persons other than the owners of the land.
Von Benda-Beckmann and Taale demonstrate that the conflicting versions of
adat have coexisted in an open-ended, imprecise way-their respective
influence ebbing and flowing with the social and political power of the
protagonists. Understandably, the village is reluctant to disturb this complex
skein of adat rights by confronting the difficult questions of ownership and
boundaries that inevitably follow any attempt to register rights.
121. See Sihombing, supra note 59. Writing in 1979, Franz von Benda-Beckmann reported that very
little land in the Minangkabau region had been registered under the BAL. See VON BENDA-BECKMANN,
supra note 19, at 213.
122. See BAL, Conversion Provisions, art. 2.
123. See VON BENDA-BECKMANN, supra note 19, at 361-72 (discussing move to nuclear family
affiliation in property matters).
124. See KNETsCH & TREBILCOCK, supra note 111, at 40 (discussing analogous situation in Papua
New Guinea). These authors argue that the "very act of embarking upon a registration programme will
provoke a host of otherwise dormant disputes." id. For a discussion of the complexities of identifying
which traditional group owns which land and what overlapping claims there may be in relation to that land,
see SIMPSON, supra note 111, at 224.
125. See von Benda-Beckmann & Taale, supra note 58, at 19-20, 24.
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3. Indonesian Government and World Bank Registration Programs
This potential for conflict between adat principles and the registration
process of the BAL has received less attention than it deserves in current
schemes to improve land administration in Indonesia. For example, the
government's PRONA program, instituted in 1981 to accelerate the process
of registration, 26 has concentrated on reducing the costs associated with
systematic registration of land in urban areas, especially in Java.2 7 In
particular, whereas the original and prohibitive fee for systematic registration
was one percent of the "local standard price" of the land, PRONA has
replaced it with charges based on ad hoc assessments of the applicant's
income." Similarly, the World Bank's Land Administration Project will
focus on reducing costs and committing resources to systematic registration.
The World Bank project envisions a two-stage process. First, the project will
attempt to register individual titles in Java and urban areas.' 29 Second, the
project will undertake pilot studies for registration of group titles in adat
areas. 30 Essentially, the World Bank takes the optimistic view that title
registration and an effective land market are the answers to Indonesia's land
ills.' It recommends reforming the BAL only "in the longer term," and
even then it sees the BAL's problems as limited to its restrictions on land
lease periods and ownership of land rights.' 32 As I shall argue below, the
Bank's approach is far too simplistic, as it ignores serious problems of dispute
resolution, adat-state bifurcation, widespread unlawful occupancy, and
inequitable processes of development.
4. Dispute Resolution
Allowing registration of communal rights renders the BAL more
consistent with adat, but, as the Minangkabau and Ambon case studies
suggest, it will not create legal unity and certainty if it is unaccompanied by
effective dispute resolution. Accordingly, the dispute-resolving ability of the
committee conducting systematic registrations, and in particular that of the
"two members of the Village Government" who sit on the committee, 133 is
crucial to restore the objectives of the BAL. Yet village government for these
126. See Decision of Interior Minister No. 230 (1981). PRONA stands for Proyek Operasi Nasional
Agraria (The Operational Project for National Land).
127. See MACANDREWS, supra note 13, at 60. See generally DJOKO PRAKOSO & BUDIMAN ADI
PuRWANTO, EKSISTENSI PRONA [THE EXISTENCE OF PRONA] (1985); SH. SUDJITO, PRONA (1987).
128. See MACANDREWS, supra note 13, at 87 nn.1-2.
129. See WORLD BANK, INDONESIA LAND ADMINISTRATION PROJEcT: LOAN AND PROJECT
SUMMARY 1-2 (on file with author).
130. See id. at 2.
131. See WORLD BANK, DOC. No. 9591-IND, INDONESIA: LAND RESOURCES MANAGEMENT AND
PLANNING at vi-x (Draft Report, July 26, 1991) (on file with author).
132. See id. at viii.
133. See Government Regulation No. 10, 1961 L.N. 28, art. 3, para. 3 (Mar. 23) (Indon.)
(concerning land registration). Notably, a draft of the proposed new law on title registration similarly
requires that the village chief (lurah), who is not a member of traditional adat authority, sit on the
registration committee. However, it does allow the committee discretion to include an adat leader. See
Draft Government Regulation on Land Registration of Jan. 2, 1966, art. 14, para. 5 (Indon.).
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purposes is not traditional adat authority, which one might expect to have the
best chance of effective dispute resolution. Instead, it is a committee
established pursuant to the Law on Village Government, which created three
sources of official village authority: the lurah (village administrator), the
kepala desa (village head), and the LKMD (village governing council). 34
The lurah, originally a Javanese adat figure, is now a civil servant appointed
by the governor. 35 The LKMD is also appointed by the governor, but on the
advice of the district head.' 36 The kepala desa receives a stipend from the
government, but is elected by the villagers.' 37 One commentator states that,
in many cases, the lurah and kepala desa are younger men or women with
little knowledge of local adat rules or particular adat rights.'38 Another
commentator argues that the application of the Law on Village Government
has caused conflict in Minangkabau, particularly where village governing
councils have replaced adat councils. He states further that the strict
application of the law will ultimately lead to the abolition of village adat
society. 
139
It seems clear, therefore, that the committee conducting systematic
registration will be a state institution separated from local adat history and
authority. Some conclusions about the resulting prospects of its ability to
create legal unity and certainty in areas that remain subject to strong adat
authority may be gleaned from Keebet von Benda-Beckmann's study of an
analogous situation involving dispute resolution in Minangkabau.' 4 ° Von
Benda-Beckmann demonstrates that in a number of disputes the separation of
adat and state dispute resolution agencies increased uncertainty by allowing
de facto forum-shopping opportunities. 4' She also demonstrates that the
application of adat rules by state institutions diverged greatly from their
operation in the adat context because these rules were applied without utilizing
or even taking into account the adat processes from which they sprang. 42
She concludes persuasively that determinations by state institutions rarely
settle disputes in a definitive way, and are only one factor taken into account
134. See Law No. 5 (1979) (on village government); Colin MacAndrews, The Structure of
Government in Indonesia, in CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA 20, 25,
39 (Colin MacAndrews ed., 1986); see also WARREN, supra note 19, at 239-66; Sihombing, supra note
59, at 16
135. See MacAndrews, supra note 134, at 39 n.24 (discussing Presidential Decision No. 28 of 1980).
136. See id.
137. See id. at 25.
138. See A.P. PARLINDUNGAN, BEBERAPA MASALAH DALAM UUPA [SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE
BALI 13 (1993).
139. See Sihombing, supra note 59, at 16; cf. Social Injustice Threatens Unity, JAKARTA POST, Apr.
15, 1994, at 2 (stating that Law on Village Government "has been long criticised by social scientists who
call it a disaster"). For a detailed discussion of the Law on Village Government and the inappropriateness
of its application in Bali, see WARREN, supra note 19, at 239-66.
140. See generally VON BENDA-BECKMANN, supra note 103.
141. See id. at 37-63. For a further example of the disassociation of village institutions and state
courts in Lombok, see Fons Strijbosch, Recognition of Folk Institutions for Dispute-Settlement in Lombok,
Indonesia, in PEOPLE'S LAW AND STATE LAW 331 (Antony Allot & Gordon R. Woodman eds., 1985).
142. See VON BENDA-BECKMANN, supra note 103, at 21-35; see also Herman Slaats & Karen
Portier, Legal Plurality and the Transformation of Normative Concepts in the Process of Litigation in Karo
Batak Society, in ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS, supra note 22, at 217-40.
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both by the disputants themselves and in the village at large. 143 If this
analysis is applied to the process of systematic registration, it seems most
likely that determinations made by either the committee conducting systematic
registrations or by the appellate courts will not effectively resolve registration
disputes.'" Instead, because these determinations usually will be inconsistent
with the flexible and communal property relationships of adat, they are likely
to be unacceptable to adat law and authority, and, thus, to lead to
disassociation and conflict between adat practice and state tenure. This is
likely to be a particular problem in the context of rapid economic
development, as state tenure is relied upon for economic activities not desired
by local adat authority.
5. Indefeasibility
In these circumstances, proposals to confer indefeasibility on registered
titles'45 are clearly misconceived. Indefeasibility may create a hollow
certainty for the purposes of formal law, but it will exacerbate conflict
between local practice and state tenure and lead to injustice whenever state
agencies assist state titleholders to override adat titleholders. Indefeasibility
also overlooks two other features of modem Indonesian land administration.
First, corruption is persistently alleged to exist in the process of granting
rights to land.'4 6 Second, it is not unknown for villagers to be unaware of
proposals to register titles to land in their possession, even when that
information is on display in the office of the lurah or kepala desa for the very
purpose of allowing challenges by affected parties. 47  This latter
phenomenon is often due to the facts that the modem "village," at least for
formal legal purposes, can be very large, particularly in densely populated
Java, and that the offices of the lurah and kepala desa are distanced from
daily village life. 148 With regard to this first point, it is extraordinary to
consider, for example, that before a dam was built in the Kedung Ombo area
of Central Java in the late 1980s, 21,938 families inhabited only 33
"villages." 149
143. See VON BENDA-BECKMANN, supra note 103, at 106-11, 139-42.
144. See KNETsCH & TREBILCOCK, supra note 111, at 40 ("[fP]ast experience has again shown, it
is one thing to resolve land disputes on paper; it is quite another thing to persuade or compel all parties
to respect their resolution thereafter."). This general problem is exacerbated in Indonesia by the lack of
guidelines or general principles for resolving registration disputes, and by the fact that the Land Registry
office sometimes refuses to follow court orders to rectify the register. See PARLINDUNGAN, supra note 91,
at 97-98.
145. See MACANDREWS, supra note 13, at 75-76.
146. See WORLD BANK, supra note 129, at 1; Reports on Human Rights Violations, 3 INDON. HUM.
RTS. F. 19 (1992); cf. Guidelines Set for Repelita VI, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 24, 1995, at 1 (discussing
government attempts to decrease corruption in development).
147. See Interview with Head of Land Disputes Section of Jakarta's Legal Aid Organisation (LBH),
in Jakarta (Feb. 15, 1995) [hereinafter Interview with Head of Land Disputes Section].
148. Thus, villages are divided further into neighboring associations (rukun warga) and household
associations (rukun keluarga). See MAcANDREWS, supra note 13, at 25.
149. See Erman Rajagukguk, Law, Land, and the Natural Environment in the Kedungombo Greenbelt
Area at the Central Javanese Village of Giliredjo, 28 LAw & Soc'y REV. 623, 623 (1994).
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G. Costs and Benefits
In summary, the BAL is overly ambitious. Extending a system of
registered tenure across an archipelago dominated by unwritten, communal
customary laws is an immensely difficult task. To give it a Western-style,
individualized cast brings serious risks-risks of delays, disputation,
continuing de facto pluralism, ultimate erosion of traditional social structure,
and uneven patterns of development. These problems mean that both the legal
unity and the enhanced certainty that are supposed to result from registration
of titles will not materialize.
III. THE NEW PLURALISM
While the BAL's overarching attempt to unify Indonesian land law
through a title registration process runs its course, it contemplates that
Indonesians will continue to be governed by adat law, albeit only by adat law
that is consistent with national unity or with the BAL and other
regulations. 5 ' The next section analyzes the extent to which this long-term
interim arrangement serves the legal needs of Indonesians, particularly in
relation to certainty, predictability, and access to the benefits of development.
This analysis will illustrate the nature of the new pluralism in Indonesian land
law.
A. Disassociation and Erosion of Adat Authority
The widespread nonregistration of land in Indonesia has been entrenched
by complex legal requirements relating to the transfer of land. Government
regulations provide that all land transfers must be conducted before a
designated Land Deed Official, known as a PPAT, appointed by the Minister
of Internal Affairs.' If the land is unregistered, the transaction must be
verified by the lurah or kepala desa and endorsed, with the aid of land-tax
documents, by the subdistrict head. '52 In addition, where the land is within
the jurisdiction of a Land Registry Office, a letter is required from the LRO
confirming that the land is indeed unregistered. 53 Finally, where the land
is agricultural, as is most unregistered land in Indonesia, the consent of the
Governor or Regional Head is necessary before the transfer can be
150. See BAL, art. 5; see also id. Explanatory Memorandum, General Elucidation, pt. III, para. I
(Indon.).
151. See GAuTAMA & HARsONO, supra note 14, at 48-49 (discussing Government Regulation No.
10, 1961 L.N. 28, art. 19 (Mar. 23) (Indon.) (concerning land registration)).
152. See id. at 49 (discussing Government Regulation No. 10, 1961 L.N. 28, arts. 22, 25 (Mar. 23)
(Indon.) (concerning land registration)). This involves, among other things, a request for "right conversion
legalisation" being displayed at the offices of the lurah, subdistrict chief, and Land Registry Office at
Regency level for a period of two months before the transaction can proceed. See Regulation of the
Minister of Agricultural and Agrarian Affairs No. 2 of Sept. 1, 1962, as amended by Regulation of the
Minister of Agrarian Affairs No. 2, 1964 T.L.N. 2626 (Jan. 6) (Indon.); SALINDEHO, supra note 38, at
155.
153. See GAUTAMA & HARSONO, supra note 14, at 49.
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registered."tM This process is slow, complex, and, above all, costly. Thus,
many who conduct land transfers simply ignore these requirements. Such
unregistered transactions are regarded as legally valid, but the local Land
Registry Office is almost certain to refuse to provide a certificate on the basis
of one.5 5 Village heads are also expressly prohibited from verifying
nonconforming land sales, and may be punished if they do. 56 As a result,
nonconforming transfers beget further nonconforming transfers, and most adat
communities continue to rely on the traditional authority of the tuan tanah
(master of the land), or its equivalent, in order to verify land transactions. 157
Relying on adat authority to verify and record land ownership and
transactions provided a measure of certainty in the past."'5 In modem times,
however, for reasons of colonial history,'59 modem government policy,"6°
and economic development itself,' 6 ' adat authority has ceased to function
in urban areas and in many parts of Java. 62 Instead, these areas are
governed directly by state officials in accordance with the Law on Village
Government. However, as a result of the delays, costs, and complexities
discussed above, 63 these officials have not performed the verification role
of adat authority. Consequently, there has been a notable increase in the
154. See id. at 50 (discussing Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs of Oct. 21, 1970, No.
SK 59/DDA/1970, art. 2 (Indon.)).
155. See id. at 53.
156. See id. at 50 (discussing Government Regulation No. 10, 1961 L.N. 28, arts. 43, 44 (Mar. 23)
(Indon.) (concerning land registration)).
157. For a discussion of the land supervisor (tuan tanah) and its equivalents, see TER HAAR, supra
note 2, at 91-93. This reliance on adat authority has its risks. According to Salindeho, article 8 of the
Regulation of the Minister of Agrarian Affairs No. 2 (1962) (Indon.) states that any transfer of ownership
of adat lands without a request for verification of that right from the lurah or kepala desa will
automatically lead to a five year right of use only, after which time the land will revert from the transferee
back to the state. See SALINDEHO, supra note 38, at 157.
158. See TER HAAR, supra note 2, at 106-07 (discussing traditional dispute-prevention function of
adat authorities).
159. For example, in the colonial period, adat authority in Java was affected significantly by
manipulation of traditional social structures such as the "culture system" for economic purposes. See S.
POMPE, INDoNESIAN LAW 1949-1989, at 179 (1992). Paradoxically, in this period, villages became better
defined units under the influence of the administrative needs of colonial government. See MACANDREWS,
supra note 13, at 18-19. As to the effect of the VOC period on traditional social structure, see HIROYOSHI
KANo, LAND TENURE SYSTEM AND THE DESA COMMUNITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY JAVA 4 (Institute
of Dev. Econ. Special Paper No. 5, 1977). The change from rotational to permanent cultivation in Java
early this century eroded the traditional prohibition on alienation. See Rajagukguk, supra note 54, at 132.
The Japanese occupation is also said to have eroded adat authority by making people less susceptible to
orthodox social pressures. See Darmawi, supra note 56, at 307-08.
160. For example, the Law on Village Government has imposed an overlay of "official" local
authority through which government actions affecting local communities are channeled. See supra
Subsection II.F.4. Another example is the way in which the BAL requires the PPAT to take over adat
authorities' traditional verification and recording role in relation to land transactions. See supra Section
III.A. It appears also that the BAL's encouragement of individual tenure will contribute to the erosion of
adat authority. See supra Subsection II.F.1.
161. The rapid increase in land values in many areas of Java and Sumatra, in combination with the
BAL's lifting of the traditional prohibition on alienation of land to outsiders, has triggered the transfer of
large amounts of land to persons not subject to local adat authority. These purchasers usually do not
comply with the apparently unenforced requirement that land transferees reside in the same subdistrict
(kecematan). See MACANDREWS, supra note 13, at 37; Rajagukguk, supra note 54, at 134-38.
162. See PARLINDUNGAN, supra note 138, at 13.
163. See SALINDEHO, supra note 38, at 157.
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number of basic disputes involving land."6 For example, there are
numerous reports of land being sold or certificates of title being issued
without the consent either of their long-term occupiers or of others with
competing claims to the land. 65
In the absence of verification by adat authority, the traditional bulwark
against these disputes has been possession of land-tax documents known in
Java as kekitir and in Bali as pepel. But many of these documents date back
to surveys completed by the Dutch, and the chain of title through the
generations understandably has become unclear. Thus, when a group of land-
law lecturers at Udayana University, Bali, were asked why large tracts of land
in the capital, Denpasar, remained unregistered, they replied that it was due
not only to issues of cost but also to the difficulties of proving titles from
pepel documents that predated World War H.66 These documents are also
subject to potential counterclaims that they are not proof of ownership for the
purposes of the Land Registry Office. For example, the Jakarta City
Administration stated in 1995 that land-tax documents will no longer be
accepted as proof of title. 67 In addition, a number of Indonesian Supreme
Court decisions have held that land-tax documents are not definitive proof of
title to land.'
68
Notwithstanding this erosion of adat authority in urban areas and in Java,
it generally remains strong in rural areas outside Java, though it is
increasingly affected by government authority. Indeed, reports of the death of
adat may be premature. For example, in relation to the much-studied
Minangkabau, both Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann note that, though
Dutch writers have since the 1920s reported or predicted that adat would
collapse under the pressures of Islam, economic development, and
urbanization, it in fact remains highly resilient today. 69 In addition, as
noted previously, adat may continue to exist as a network of shared values
and relationships notwithstanding the destruction of adat authority. In fact, in
many areas it has become an expression of regional identity against the
pervasive social, economic, and governmental influence of the Javanese.7 0
B. Unlawful Occupancy
The deleterious effect on legal certainty that the erosion of adat authority
in urban areas and in Java has caused is paralleled by the uncertainty present
164. See 1. Verschueren, Marind-anim Land Tenure, in LAND TENURE IN ,VEST IRIAN 42, 56-58
(Special Edition of the New Guinea Research Bulletin, Australian National University, A. Ploeg ed., 1970)
(discussing erosion of Marind-anim adat authority under colonial rule in Irian Jaya and subsequent
disputation and conflict).
165. See Interview with Head of Land Disputes Section, supra note 147.
166. See Interview with Lecturers in Land Law at Udayana University, supra note 110.
167. See Councillor Expresses Dismay over Girik Document Issue, JAKARTA PosT, May 30, 1995,
at 3.
168. See, e.g., Judgment of Feb. 3, 1960, Supreme Court, Dec. No. 34 K/Sip/1960 (Indon.)
(holding that good faith buyer of land was its owner even though land-tax documents stated that name of
owner was husband of seller).
169. See generally von Benda-Beckmann & von Benda-Beckmann, supra note 115, at 606-07.
170. See infra 231-35 (assessing significance of these concerns for proposed reforms).
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in the large tracts of newly settled areas in Indonesia. This new settlement has
come about as a result of the widespread occupation of vacant urban and peri-
urban land,'71 former colonial plantation land, and former private estate
land.'72 Pursuant to the passage of the BAL, Government Regulation No.
51 of 1960 deals with these forms of "unlawful" occupation by allowing
criminal proceedings in cases of unlawful occupation occurring after June 12,
1954.173 Though efforts at peaceful resolution are to be attempted first, 74
Government Regulation No. 51 grants the Minister of Agrarian Affairs and
regional authorities unrestricted rights to bring civil proceedings for
eviction. 175 Most importantly, however, it does not allow for the acquisition
of rights through uninterrupted adverse possession, even though this is the
traditional means of acquiring adat rights to land. 176
It is arguable that the BAL sanctions this traditional way of acquiring
rights to land because article 27 allows for termination of a right to land in the
event of abandonment, and article 56 states that adat will continue to govern
the acquisition of hak milik until regulations (as yet undrafted) are put into
place. However, in practice, these provisions are applied only in areas of
established adat authority, and the notion that new forms of adat authority
may arise is not countenanced. 177 As a result, occupiers of abandoned or
171. Land speculation is a particularly profitable pursuit in rapidly growing urban areas of Indonesia.
See MACANDREWS, supra note 13, at 85. For example, the Minister of Agrarian Affairs reported in
August 1993 that 82% of all land allocated for industrial estates had been left undeveloped. See President
Orders Enforcement Plans on Land Appropriation, JAKARTA POST, Aug. 13, 1993, at 1; see also Jakarta
Developers Buying More Land Than They Need, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 16, 1992, at 3. These areas are
being occupied rapidly as urban populations continue to increase at a rate of at least 4% a year. See
MACANDREWS, supra note 13, at 58-77; see also West Jakarta Has Most Slum Areas, JAKARTA POST,
Aug. 31, 1993, at 3. It is estimated that 30,000 hectares a year of agricultural land is being converted to
nonagricultural use. See Land Agency to Review Rule on Holding Size, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 12, 1993, at
2.
172. See GAUTAMA & HORNICK, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing Law No. 1 (1958) (Indon.)
(concerning liquidation of private estates)). In 1954, the Sukarno government estimated that, in Java,
approximately 200,000 hectares of former plantation land had been occupied by 28,000 households; in
Sumatra, 125,000 households had occupied former plantation land. See Rajagukguk, supra note 54, at 56.
At one point, the Minister for Transmigration reported that there were 1.7 million families of forest
squatters in 19 of Indonesia's 27 provinces. See Integrated Plan on Transmigration Being Worked Out,
JAKARTA POST, Aug. 4, 1993, at 2. Occupants of former plantation and private estate land generally lack
any formal rights as most of this land technically reverted to the state as a result of the liquidation of
private estates in 1958 and the lapse of most rights to plantation land as of September 24, 1965. However,
most, if not all, colonial holders of erfpacht rights did not seek to take up their new BAL rights. See BAL,
arts. 9, paras. 1-2, 21; GAuTAMA & HARSONO, supra note 14, at 39.
173. See GAUTAMA & HORNICK, supra note 1, at 13-15 (discussing Government Regulation (in lieu
of law) No. 51, 1960 L.N. 1598 (Dec. 14) (Indon.)).
174. See Id. (discussing Emergency Law No. 8 (1954) (Indon.), elevated to the status of statute by
Government Regulation (in lieu of law) No. 51, 1960 L.N. 1598 (Dec. 14) (Indon.)).
175. See id. (discussing Government Regulation (in lieu of law) No. 51, 1960 L.N. 1598, arts. 3,
5 (Dec. 14) (Indon.)).
176. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing traditional means by which adat rights
are acquired).
177. In some cases, adat rights acquired after 1960 may be registered as BAL rights through a
process of "recognition," but this is a matter of administrative discretion rather than legal obligation. See
MACANDREWS, supra note 13, at 31-32. For example, farmers that had been cultivating land near
Tarumajaya village in the Bekasi region of West Java were evicted from the land without compensation
on the basis that it was state hak ulayat land and that they had not acquired any rights to it through
cultivation after 1960. See Bekasi Regent Denies Illegal Land Deal, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 3, 1995, at 3.
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vacant land are subject largely to the ad hoc control of the bureaucracy, in
particular to the license-granting powers of regional authorities.' For
example, regional governors have discretionary powers to issue licenses to
cultivate land to long-term unlawful occupiers.' 79 These licenses may be
transformed over time into statutory rights on further application to the
Minister. Although the claims of long-term cultivators are intended to have
priority,'80 one Indonesian commentator states that "speculators and
manipulators" have taken advantage of the governors' power to issue licenses.
Consequently, some licenses have no lands, some occupiers have no licenses
despite being entitled to them, and some lands are subject to more than one
license.'8 '
C. Access to Credit
Another problem with the long-term nature of the continuing pluralism in
Indonesia relates to access to credit. Formal Indonesian law recognises two
securities, the hypotec, which originally applied only to pre-BAL Western
land, "'8 and the credietverband, which originally applied only to pre-BAL
Indonesian land.8 3 A hypotec requires registration in the local land registry
office with the relevant land certificate in order to be effective." 8 A
credietverband requires similar registration in order to be effective against
third parties. A credietverband over unregistered land remains effective inter
partes, but banks rarely issue credit on the strength of one because of the
In another dispute, the farmers in question claimed that they had been living in the area long before a right
of concession was granted in 1981 to a state-owned plantation company. That company did not use the
land, but in 1988 it sold a right of ownership to the land to a private developer. Subsequently, the
government threatened the farmers with eviction. See Bogor Regency To Evict 500 Farmers in Ciomas for
Luxury Housing Project, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 16, 1992, at 2.
It is also quite common for occupiers to be evicted even though they have been paying land tax on
the land. For example, shopowners who had been paying land tax in Ruwasari Timor, Jakarta, had their
houses and shops demolished without compensation in 1994 on the basis that the land in question was
owned by the City Administration. See Rmvasari Timur Traders Will Get No Compensation, JAKARTA
POST, Oct. 25, 1994, at 3. Finally, in some cases, uninterrupted occupancy that predates 1960 is deemed
not to lead to the acquisition of statutory rights. See, e.g., Lesson for All Concerned, JAKARTA POST, Oct.
15, 1994, at 4; Military Chief Rights Commission Visit Benhil Area, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 13, 1994, at
3 (reporting Bendungan Hilir dispute in which some occupiers of state land had first arrived on land
thirty-five years before and had paid land tax during that time).
178. Compensation is granted occasionally on a discretionary basis to evicted occupiers, but this is
very infrequent. See MACANDREWS, supra note 13, at 61. For examples of evictions of occupiers of
former plantation lands, see 500 Farmers in Ciomas Given Notice To Leave by Bogor Regent, JAKARTA
POST, Apr. 22, 1992, at 2.
179. See PARLINDUNGAN, supra note 138, at 70-72 (discussing Law No. 1 (1961) (Indon.); Decree
of Minister of Internal Affairs No. 38, art. 4(g) (1981) (Indon.)).
180. Before 1980, a number of regulations provided for rights to be issued to long-term cultivators
of former Western land. See PARUNDtJNGAN, supra note 138, at 70-72. Since 1980, however, this land
has reverted to the state by virtue of Presidential Decision No. 32 of 1979, and long-term cultivators only
have "priority" in relation to the issue of rights. See id. at 72.
181. See id. at 73. Parlundingan goes on to consider a number of press reports relating to abuses
of the license-granting power. See id.
182. But see Regulation of the Minister of Agrarian Affairs No. 15 of Sept. 23, 1961 (Indon.)
(concerning registration of hypotec and credietverband).
183. See id.
184. See GAUTAMA & HARSONO, supra note 14, at 84 (discussing INDON. CIV. CODE art. 1179).
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difficulties of giving notice of rights to third parties. As a result, titleholders
to unregistered land tend to rely on small-scale unofficial credit, which, for
reasons of risk and monopoly power, is accompanied by high interest
charges.185 They also have access to governmental schemes for the provision
of credit without security. These schemes, however, have not allowed for the
initiation of development projects, as they are for specific, government-
controlled purposes,'86 such as improving rice production. Moreover, they
have been scaled down because of high levels of defaults. 1
87
D. Development as a Legal Norm
1. The Kedung Ombo Dam Case
A related area in which the legal needs of most Indonesians are not being
served is the acquisition of land for development. In particular, there are both
a lack of certainty and a lack of access to the benefits of development.
Because most land is unregistered, because dealing with unregistered adat
titles involves a significant degree of uncertainty, and because unregistered
titleholders cannot use their titles as security to fund their own development
projects, almost all development projects in Indonesia use the laws on the
acquisition of land for development to obtain titles directly from the state.
Ideally, these laws should enhance legal certainty, planning, and the efficient
allocation of resources by clearly setting out the procedures for negotiation,
acquisition, appeal, and the assessment of compensation. However, in
Indonesia, the courts and the bureaucracy have subjugated these procedures
to the overriding principle of "development." This may be illustrated by the
Kedung Ombo Dam Case,t88 an important decision that also reveals the
modem operation of the BAL's notion that all rights to land have a social
function.
The case involved the 1975 Decree of the Minister for Internal Affairs on
Release (pembebasan) of Title and the 1993 Presidential Decision on
Procurement (pengadaan) of Title. Both of these laws allow for land to be
acquired for development. Unlike the 1961 Law on Revocation (pencabutan)
of Title, which mandates compulsory acquisition, these laws require
discussion and deliberation (mufakat dan musywarah) with titleholders, and
185. See PARLINDUNGAN, supra note 91, at 55-56. It appears that there is a great deal of unofficial
credit in the Indonesian economy. See MAcANDREWS, supra note 13, at4, 116; see also Fons Strijbosch,
Credit Contracts on the Island of Lombok, in ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS, supra note
22, at 288, 288-305 (describing development and use of unofficial credit contracts on Lombok).
186. This approach is confirmed by the view of the Minister for National Development Planning that
the state needs to be strongly interventionist in relation to development of the traditional sector. See Two
Strategies Suggested for Development, JAKARTA POST, May 29, 1995, at 1.
187. See James Kern, The Growth of Decentralized Rural Credit Institutions in Indonesia, in
MACANDREWS, supra note 134, at 101, 101-31. Even in the BIMAS program, borrowers of larger loans
had to provide a letter from the Land Registry Office stating that registration was in progress. See
MACANDREWS, supra note 13, at 38.
188. These submissions are summarized in the Appeal Court's judgment. Judgment of the Supreme
Court (App. Ct.), Dec. No. 2263 K/Pdt./1991, at 102-08 (Indon.); Judgment of the Supreme Court (Rev.
Ct), Dec. No. 650 PK/Pdt./1994, at 55-58 (Indon.).
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their "acceptance" of the amount and form of compensation. They also
require that compensation be based on the "local standard price" of the land
and buildings.' 9
The dispute arose out of a proposal in the early 1980s to construct, with
the support of the World Bank, a large dam at Kedung Ombo in the
Genengsari subdistrict of Central Java. Construction of the dam required the
use of approximately 6127 hectares of land'90 inhabited by 5300
families.' 9 ' In 1987, the governor of Central Java declared that the
titleholders had accepted his offer of compensation as required by the 1975
Decree on Release of Title. Accordingly, the Boyolali District Court ordered
the transfer of the titleholders' land, buildings, and crops to the state. The
dam gates were closed and the titleholders' land flooded. Fifty-four
titleholders then brought an action in the district court at Semarang seeking
nullification of the Boyolali District Court order, compensation for the
acquisition, and damages for the unlawful flooding." Their principal
submissions in the Semarang court, and on cassation in the Supreme Court of
Indonesia, and on further review in the Supreme Court, may be divided into
three parts. '93
The first part concerned the way in which the negotiations for
compensation were conducted. The applicants adduced evidence that (1) the
authorities had obtained thumbprints from illiterate titleholders without
informing them that they were thereby agreeing to both the appropriation and
the amount and form of compensation; (2) the inhabitants of some areas
(e.g., Boyolali and Grobongan) had never been included in the
negotiations; 95 and (3) the head of the Boyolali District Court, the head of
the local subdistrict (Kemusu), and a representative from the local social and
political office had said during negotiations that those who did not accept the
compensation offer would be imprisoned for three months or fined Rp.
10,000, and that ownership of their land and buildings would revert to the
government without compensation. 96 On the basis of this evidence, the
applicants submitted that the defendants had not adhered to the requirement
of discussion and deliberation set out in the 1975 Decree. 197
The second part of the applicants' submissions related to the Central Java
governor's declaration that agreement had been reached with the title holders.
The applicants relied on evidence that some titleholders had continued to
dispute the proferred compensation, for example, through delegations that
petitioned the House of Representatives and the World Bank. They submitted
189. See Judgment of the Supreme Court (App. Ct.), Dec. No. 2263K/Pdt./1991 (Indon.), Summary
of Submissions of the Parties, at 97-101 [hereinafter 2263 Summary Submissions] (translation on file with
author); see also The Summary of the Respondents Submissions in the Review Court Judgment, Dec. 650,
at 88-93.
190. See id.
191. See Rajagukguk, supra note 54, at 624.







that, in these circumstances, the governor could not declare that an agreement
had been reached. Accordingly, the order from the Boyolali district court
transferring the land, buildings, and crops of the titleholders to the state
contravened the requirement of acceptance in the 1975 Decree. 19
The third part of the applicants' submissions related to the sufficiency of
the compensation offered. The applicants relied on evidence that the amount
of compensation was below the local public price, thereby contravening the
1975 Decree's stipulation that compensation be based on that price. The
applicants also adduced evidence that the substitute land not only was smaller
than the land taken away but was also rugged and contained lime, making it
difficult to obtain water for irrigation.'99
The principal submissions in response by the defendants included the
following:2" First, the applicants had not proven that they held any property
rights to the land or buildings in question, as they lacked the appropriate
certificates of title.20 1 Second, compensation had been accepted for 5781.55
hectares of the 6127 hectares of land necessary for the project. The people
who did not accept the compensation inhabited only approximately 345.45
hectares.2 2 The applicants had been invited to discussions on the question
of compensation, but had not attended. Therefore, in the context of the
government's development drive, the land acquisition had been carried out on
the basis of consensus and discussions and deliberations with the titleholders
as required by the 1975 decree.
The lower court in Semarang rejected the applicants' claim without
providing reasons for its decision.2" 3 The High Court at Semarang District
Court confirmed the lower court's decision. 2 4 The applicants requested
cassation of both of these decisions in the Supreme Court of Indonesia.20 5
In a decision dated July 28, 1993, the appeals court of the Supreme Court0 6
overturned the decisions of the Semarang courts and ordered that the flooded
lands and buildings be compensated at a rate of Rp. 50,000 (approximately
U.S. $21) per square meter, and the crops at a rate of Rp. 30,000 per square
meter.207  The court also ordered damages of Rp. 2,000,000,000
(approximately U.S. $900,000) for the unlawful flooding.20 ' Essentially, the
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 97-101.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See Judgment of Dec. 20, 1990, District Court of Semarang, Dec. No.
l17/Pdt./C/1990/PN.Smg. (Indon.), citedin 2263 Summary Submissions, supra note 189.
204. See Judgment of Apr. 9, 1991, District Court of Semarang (High Ct.), Dec. No.
143/Pdt./G/19911PN.Smg. (Indon.), cited in 2263 Summary Submissions, supra note 189.
205. See Cassation Application Deed No. 31/Pdt.Kasasi/1991.PN.Smg., cited in 2263 Summary
Submissions, supra note 189. The power of the Supreme Court to hear cases on cassation is set out in
article 10 of Law No. 14 of 1970 on the Powers of the Judiciary. Cassation in Indonesia has its ordinary
meaning, that is, an appeal restricted to errors of law only. See H. M. RIDHWAN INDRA, THE POWER OF
THE INDONESIAN SUPREME COURT 2 (1994).
206. The appeals court consisted of the head of the appeals division of the Supreme Court, Z. Asikin
Kusumah Atmadja, and two other judges, H. Am. Manrapi and R. L. Tobing. See Judgment of the
Supreme Court (App. Ct.), Dec. No. 2263 K/Pdt./1991, at 135 (Indon.).
207. See 2263 Summary Submissions, supra note 189, at 133.
208. See id.
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decision stated that the defendants had failed to comply with the 1975 Decree
on release of title.2° In particular, (1) there had been insufficient discussion
and deliberation with the titleholders,210 (2) not all titleholders had accepted
the government's proposal, 211 and (3) tmonetary compensation had been
insufficient because the poverty of the titleholders required that the
compensation allow them to buy equivalent land or buildings.
The respondents sought a "review" of the appeals court's decision
pursuant to Law No. 14 of 1985, which grants the Chief Justice discretionary
power to review Supreme Court appeals court decisions. 22 Although the
review court2 13 upheld this application on a number of grounds, three in
particular were said to be sufficient in themselves to justify the decision.214
The review court determined that the Boyolali District Court's orders
transferring the applicants' rights to land, buildings, and crops to the state
were valid because: (1) all rights to land have a social function, meaning that
individual rights must succumb to the interests of the community in matters
of public interest; (2) the Kedung Ombo dam was in the public interest; and
(3) the law must support the process of national development, 215 as required
by House of Representatives Law No. 111 of 1993, which the Supreme Court
applied in similar circumstances in the Mican Dam Case.216 Under these
circumstances, it was not necessary for the court to consider whether the
legislative requirements of discussion and deliberation and acceptance by the
titleholders had been satisfied.
2. Ad Hoc Bureaucratic Control of Land
In other words, the court in Kedung Ombo elevated the principles of
social function and development to the status of legal norms that override
209. See supra text accompanying note 189.
210. Although the committee is not expressly required to conduct negotiations on the traditional
Indonesian principle of discussion and deliberation, it must "be guided by regulations that are based" on
that principle. See BAL, art. 1, para. 3.
211. If the titleholders do not accept the amount or form of the compensation, the committee may
maintain its decision or submit the matter for resolution by the Governor. See BAL, art. 8, para. 1. The
Governor has the power to confirm the committee's decision or make a different decision "shaped by
finding a middle way that is acceptable to the two parties." See id. art. 8, para. 2. It is notable that the
Governor is not given the power to compel titleholders to accept the compensation offered or to order them
from their lands or buildings in the event of continuing disagreement. That power remains vested
exclusively in the President by virtue of article 1 of the 1961 Law on Appropriation.
212. See Law No. 14, arts. 67-72 (1985) (Indon.) (on the powers of the judiciary). Unlike cassation,
a "review" is not limited to consideration of errors of law. See INDRA, supra note 205, at 3. Himawan
points out that disgruntled litigants in the Supreme Court almost invariably apply to the Chief Justice for
a review, thereby creating a de facto court of appeal never intended under the original three tiered system.
See Charles Himawan, How Not To Intervene in a Judicial Process, JAKARTA PosT, May 16, 1995, at 1.
213. The review court consisted of Chief Justice H. R. Purwoto S. Gandasubrata and four other
judges: H. Soejono, H. Samsoeddin Aboubakar, Olden Bidara, and Sarwata. See Dec. No. 650
PK/Pdt./1994, at 101 (Indon.).
214. See Judgment of the Supreme Court, Dec. No. 650 PK/Pdt/1994, at 98 (Indon.).
215. See id. at 96-97.
216. See Judgment of July 19, 1990, Supreme Court, Dec. No. 135 K/Pdt./1989 (Indon.).
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otherwise applicable legislation or regulations.2"7 The malleability of these
principles means that legal justification can almost always be found, even ex
post facto, for ad hoe bureaucratic actions in relation to land. This entrenches
a vicious cycle in Indonesian development, in which unregistered occupiers
of land cannot obtain credit to initiate their own development, and private
developers eschew the uncertainties of dealing with them in favor of
expropriating land through collusion with regional authorities. In these
situations, the compensation offered is usually well below market price.218
This process may be convenient and lucrative for regional authorities, but it
leads to a high level of conflict with local communities and threatens to create
long-term disruption of development projects.2 9 It also means that land is
not chosen for its economic utility to the project, but rather because the
inhabitants lack the sociopolitical power to prevent its expropriation. In short,
the modem operation of Indonesian land law and administration is not, as
purported by the BAL, "based on adat principles."220 In fact, the perverse
modem result of the BAL's adoption of adat concepts is that those principles,
in particular that of social function, have served simply as legal cover for
arbitrary and inequitable bureaucratic control of land administration.221
E. The Role of the Courts
All this is not to say that the BAL's adoption of adat concepts was a
cynical exercise from the outset. The intention of the BAL appears to have
been that the State would develop the BAL's adat features over time to
counteract its Western attributes, and thereby improve the prospects for its
acceptance by the Indonesian people. In this process, the role of the judiciary
would necessarily be crucial.' Yet, as has been seen, the courts under the
217. A related use of the principle of development by the Supreme Court occurred in the Pluit
Polder Plan Case, in which the eviction of landowners in West Jakarta was held to be a nonjusticiable
administrative act committed in furtherance of development under the Pluit Polder Plan. See Judgment of
Mar. 25, 1976, Supreme Court. For a further discussion of the use of "social function" as the legal
justification for land expropriation, see Sunario Basuki, The Concept of State as Landholder, 3 INDoN.
HUM. RTs. F. 13, 14 (1992).
218. Even the World Bank admits that the assessment of compensation for land acquisition causes
social conflict and disruption. See WORLD BANK, supra note 131, at 20-21.
219. A recent example is the rioting experienced in the Timika region of Irian Jaya as a result of
local opposition to the gold and copper mine operated by PT Freeport Indonesia. See Irian Copper Town
Calm But Tense After Riots, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 14, 1996, at 1.
220. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. These principles might consist of mutual assistance,
harmony, discussion and deliberation, and social function in its original sense. See supra notes 24-30 and
accompanying text; see also Supomo, supra note 94, at 235 ("Traditional adat law expresses such
universal values as the principle of mutual aid, the social function of man and property in the community,
the principle of consent as a basis of public authority, and the principle of representation and consultation
in the system of government.").
221. See MILTON SANTOS, THE SHARED SPACE 27 (1979) (discussing way in which such dualisms
in developing countries actually disguise hegemony of "upper circuit").
222. See, e.g., HOOKER, supra note 29, at 6-8; TER HAAR, supra note 2, at 228-34; BuMs, supra
note 24, at 109 (discussing ter Haar's view on fundamental role of judges in attaining Indonesian legal
unity); Djojdigoeno, Adat Law in Indonesia, 49 ASIAN REV. 38, 38-44 (1953). It is tempting to draw
parallels between incorporating adat principles into formal law in Indonesia and the development of the
common law from Anglo-Saxon custom in England. However, there are such crucial differences between
the two processes that the attempt in Indonesia should be jettisoned. These differences include the
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New Order government have used the principle of social function to excuse
apparent failures to comply with legislative requirements governing the
acquisition of land for development. They have also failed to develop any
meaningful principles to govern the application of "discussion and
deliberation" in the context of the formal legal system."2 3 Indeed, there is
a widespread lack of public confidence in the courts' independence and
competence. This is due largely to a perception that the judiciary is
corrupt.224 In part, this perception arises because court orders are often
ignored by the bureaucracy.2" Finally, and perhaps most significantly in the
long run, courts are guilty of "legal norm shopping" in order to attain the
result desired by the state; they apply one of a wide range of potentially
applicable legal rules or principles to a case without providing predictable or
consistent reasons for the choice. A good example of this phenomenon is the
use of the power of review and the principles of social function and
development in the Kedung Ombo Dam Case discussed previously.
Many of these issues, particularly legal norm shopping, are highlighted
by reports of a recent land acquisition dispute in Irian Jaya. This dispute arose
out of the Irian Jayan government's expropriation of sixty-two hectares of
communal land near Sentani Airport in Irian Jaya in 1984. Hancock Hebe
Ohee, the head of the Ongge and Hanoch subclans that owned the land
according to its adat law, brought an action in the Jayapura District Court
against the governor of Irian Jaya claiming a greater amount of compensation
than had been offered.22 6 Mr. Ohee succeeded in the District Court in July
1985 and on appeal in the Supreme Court in 1988. The Supreme Court
ordered that Rp. 8,600,000,000 (approximately U.S. $4,200,000) be paid to
the plaintiff as compensation for the loss of the communal land.22 ' The Irian
Jayan provincial government apparently refused to pay this sum, arguing that
it lacked the funds. An impasse ensued. Finally, in April 1995, Chief Justice
Soerjono of the Supreme Court sent a letter pursuant to the 1985 Law on the
Supreme Court, which, inter alia, empowers the Chief Justice to give
instructions and guidance to lower courts,228 directing the Jayapura District
Court not to execute the 1988 Supreme Court decision. Chief Justice Soerjono
tremendous regional diversity in adat, varying stages of economic development, the existence of a
patrimonial state bent on rapid economic development, the absence of an independent judiciary, and the
postcolonial, oligarchic alliance of bureaucracy and private commercial interests in Indonesia. The net
effect is that the process of incorporating adat principles into formal law has been subverted and perversely
used to give legal legitimacy to the arbitrary exercise of executive power.
223. For example, the courts in Kedung Ombo failed to respond to the respondents' submission that
the requirement of discussion and deliberation had been satisfied.
224. The Secretary-General of the National Commission on Human Rights reportedly said that most
people who lose their land choose to file their complaints with the Commission because common people
are most likely to lose in court and stronger industrialists with government backing are almost sure to win.
See Judges Advised To Follow Code of Ethics, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 29, 1995, at 2.
225. For example, the Land Registry Office has been known to refuse to follow court orders to
rectify the registration of land titles. See PARLINDUNGAN, supra note 138, at 97-98.
226. See Group of Young Lawyers Decry Chief Justice, JAKARTA PoST, May 2, 1995, at 2; Moslem
Students Protest over Irian Jayan Land Row, JAKARTA PoST, May 13, 1995, at 2.
227. See Moslem Students Protest over Irian Jaya Land Row, supra note 226; Irian Man Can Start
Again, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 27, 1995, at 2.
228. See INDRA, supra note 205, at 3; Himawan, supra note 212, at 1 (discussing Law No. 14, art.
32 (1985) (Indon.)).
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based his direction principally on the grounds that the governor of Irian Jaya
was only an individual and that the relevant defendant should have been the
Irian Jayan government which was the legal entity holding the land in
question. 9 It is notable that when former Chief Justice Purwoto S.
Gandasubrata, under whom Kedung Ombo was decided, was asked to
comment on Chief Justice Soerjono's actions, he replied that very often a
Chief Justice will intervene in a case handled by the Supreme Court at the
instigation of third parties and not on his or her own initiative. He also
reportedly stated that "[we] often receive requests from the government to
cancel or delay the execution of a Supreme Court ruling in the name of
development .... "230
The Indonesian Bar Association criticized Chief Justice Soerjono's action
on the basis that the 1985 Law on the Supreme Court did not allow the
reevaluation and reinterpretation of final Supreme Court decisions. His action
was also criticized by the National Commission for Human Rights on the basis
that the 1974 Law on Public Administration stated that regional governors
were not simply individuals but heads of provinces empowered to represent
the local people.3 Even the Minister of Justice criticized the Chief Justice's
action on the basis that the 1985 Law on the Supreme Court was not intended
to allow Chief Justices to nullify Supreme Court decisions, and that, in any
event, the issue should have been discussed openly with the other Supreme
Court justices and the direction couched in advisory terms only. Charles
Himawan has also pointed out that one consequence of the Chief Justice's
action is that Indonesia now has a de facto five-tier judicial system, when the
original intention was that it be only three-tier. 2 The first tier is the
District Court at first instance; the second is the appellate level of the District
Court; the third is the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; the fourth
is the power of review vested in the Chief Justice, which nowadays is
invariably requested by aggrieved parties; and the fifth appears to be the Chief
Justice's power to advise lower courts how to execute Supreme Court
judgments.
IV. REFORM
A. Essential Elements of Reform
Although a detailed analysis of possible reforms of Indonesian land law
is beyond the scope of this work, it is appropriate to outline some measures
that would address the problems that I have identified. Before I do this,
however, some introductory comments are necessary. Solely committing
further resources to the process of title registration, without reforming the
BAL and associated areas, will not resolve the problems with modern
Indonesian land law and administration. The problems require a holistic
229. See Group of Young Lawyers Decry Chief Justice, supra note 226; Moslem Students Protest
Over Irian Jayan Land Row, supra note 226.
230. See Kern, supra note 187, at 101-31.
231. See Law No. 5 (1974) (Indon.) (on Public Administration).
232. See Himawan, supra note 212.
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solution that addresses issues of dispute resolution, access to credit,
compulsory acquisition, corruption, unlawful occupancy, and, above all, the
relationship between adat and the state. The flaw in Indonesia's PRONA
program and the World Bank's Land Administration Project is that these
issues, especially dispute resolution, are not treated as essential to the success
of the project. Instead, there seems to be a simplistic belief that systematic
registration, accompanied by registration of group titles in adat areas, will by
itself create greater unity and certainty in Indonesian land law.
A second and related point is that the process of reforming Indonesian
land law can neither ignore adat nor assume that over time it will wither
away. It is true that adat authority has been significantly eroded in Java and
in major cities, and that in other areas, it is under considerable threat from a
combination of economic development and Government policy. Nevertheless,
adat values and practices are still likely to retain significant influence in most
rural areas of Indonesia for the foreseeable future, if only because they are
embedded in local social structure. Local adat rules and authority are also
likely to remain influential in most parts of Indonesia as an expression of
regional, non-Javanese identity. A realistic and effective Indonesian land law
must reflect this social reality if it is to avoid uncertainty, conflict, and social
dislocation.
Third, the BAL's operation shows that a vague and ill-defined attempt at
incorporating adat principles into formal statutory law cannot achieve legal
unity and certainty in Indonesia. Indeed, those adat principles that seem to be
universal-namely, the notions of equilibrium, collective unity, discussion and
deliberation, and social function-are so embedded in diverse local social
structures, and so lacking in Western-style legal predictability, that they are
not susceptible to incorporation into formal law, particularly in the context of
a patrimonial state bent on economic development and lacking an independent
judiciary. Accordingly, law reform in Indonesia must work towards
appropriate links between formal law and adat authority. In other words,
formal law should establish a balanced dualism between adat and state in
place of the present hegemony of state and bureaucracy in which adat is
subjugated and eroded and large areas lack the certainties of either traditional
adat or formal law. 33 Briefly put, this requires that the law should work
through adat authority, recognize the internal sovereignty of adat groups, and
take into account the tremendous regional variations in Indonesian adat. All
these matters may be encompassed within a system of registration, discussed
below.
B. Registration Generally
1. Internal Sovereignty of Adat Groups
In light of these introductory comments, the legislation that replaces the
233. See generally ANN SEIDMAN & ROBERT SEIDMAN, STATE AND LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS 34, 148, 167 (1994) (discussing way in which formal law in postcolonial societies has generally
been used as hegemonic tool to entrench oligarchic bureaucracies).
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BAL should establish, as a cardinal principle, the prima facie sovereignty of
adat "groups" 4 over land use and allocation within the group's boundaries.
This would entail a modified version of the pre-BAL Supreme Court position
that village decisions over land use and allocation were nonjusticiable. 5
Such a principle would give adat authority the formal status necessary for an
appropriate interaction between state and adat. It would also recognize that the
best place to resolve a land dispute is within an adat group,236 and that local
cooperation and initiative are preconditions to nondiscriminatory and
harmonious economic development. The way in which this principle of
sovereignty would interact with the process of registration is considered
below.
2. Sovereignty over Hak Ulayat Land
An adat group's sovereignty should extend to the uncultivated hak ulayat
land within its boundaries."37 This would remedy the present highly
uncertain situation in which, on the one hand, the BAL formally recognizes
original acquisition of rights by adat means (i.e., through cultivation,
clearing, or occupation),"3 while, on the other hand, the state regularly
denies formal rights to occupiers of virgin or abandoned land on the basis that
it holds a "state hak ulayat." It would also avoid the perverse economic
incentives that induce developers to seek rights in hak ulayat land, even
though it may be less suitable for development than other land, simply
because they can acquire these rights from the state at below-market price.
Finally, including hak ulayat land within an adat group's title would not
necessarily make large tracts of land unavailable for development-despite
government misconceptions to the contrary. As Franz von Benda-Beckmann
has cogently argued, traditional communities are not antagonistic to
development per se. 1 Moreover, the notion that individual titles are a
precondition to development is a myth, as any study of corporate and
cooperative landholdings in Western development would show. In any event,
where negotiated acquisition proves unsuccessful, the government will be able
234. An adat group may be defined as "a tribe, clan, section, family or other group of persons,
whose land under recognised customary law belongs communally to the persons who are for the time being
members of the group." This is the definition used in the Kenyan Land Adjudication Act that was enacted
in 1968. See SIMPSON, supra note 111, at 233.
235. See, e.g., Judgment of Nov. 26, 1958, Supreme Court, Dec. No. 361 K/Sip/1958 (Indon.) ("It
is the fixed jurisprudence of the The Supreme Court that the Court is not authorised to review a village
decision concerning land."); see also Judgment of the High Court of Surabaya, Dec. No. 162/1954.Pdt.
Both of these decisions are discussed in ABDURRAHMAN, HIMPUNAN YURISPRUDENSI HUKUM AGRARIA
[COLLECTION OF JURISPRUDENCE ON LAND LAW] 361, 366 (1980).
236. See, e.g., VON BENDA-BECKMANN, supra note 103; see also KNETSCH & TREBILCOCK, supra
note 111, at 56-57 (discussing way in which culturally consistent informal mediation led to more enduring
settlements than formal arbitration).
237. This is the case in Malawi, where, under the Customary Land Development Act of 1967, virgin
land within traditional boundaries is registered as "unallocated garden land" so that customary methods
of allocation remain valid. Similarly, in the southern states of Nigeria, all virgin land is presumed to be
subject to local rights of ownership unless shown otherwise. However, in the Sudan, the presumption goes
the other way. See SIMPSON, supra note 111, at 231-33.
238. See BAL, art. 27; see also supra notes 52, 176-81 and accompanying text.
239. See von Benda-Beckmann, supra note 115, at 129, 129-48.
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to exercise its powers of compulsory acquisition. In such situations, however,
full market price compensation should be paid in order to avoid the perverse
incentives identified above.
C. Registration Options
1. Choice of Registration
Because sporadic registration is ineffective, a process of systematic
registration should be retained.240 Adat groups, however, should have a
number of choices in relation to registration of titles and dealings. These
choices appropriately reflect the wide diversity of adat and of the stages of
economic development in regional Indonesia. Their rationale is based on three
principles. First, the appropriate goal of registration is not to alter tenure, but
to confer certainty on ownership and dealings in land. 41 Second, traditional
communities are entitled to choose to forgo economic benefits in favor of
social and cultural harmony. Third, restrictions on the alienation of some
classes of land are necessary to protect less literate and commercially
inexperienced groups in Indonesian society from landlessness and exploitation.
2. Registration as "Customary Land"
The first choice available to an adat group would be simply to register its
land as "customary land." Here, the registry map would not show titles but
only boundaries and the name of the group.24 This would cater to two
different situations. First, when customary law effectively provided certainty
of tenure and dealings, the major argument for registration of titles would
become otiose.243 Second, in cases such as the Ambon case study discussed
above, in which land disputes were so embedded in local societies,
adjudication would lead to far more conflict than certainty.
Registration as customary land would serve another crucial purpose: to
allow restraints on alienation where such restraints would be necessary to
protect vulnerable groups in Indonesian society. In particular, formal restraints
on alienation of registered customary land would recognize that granting
unfettered rights of alienation to customary landholders often leads to
landlessness, exploitation, loss of an effective source of social insurance,
244
and erosion of socially binding magico-religious connections with land. Even
where titles were otherwise registered, registration as nonalienable customary
land would also be appropriate for burial places, sacred sites, and places of
240. See id. at 140-41 (assessing effectiveness of unsystematic government regulation).
241. See SIMPSON, supra note 111, at 233.
242. This process was adopted in Malawi under the Customary Land Development Act of 1967. See
id. at 237.
243. For example, in Africa, there are many instances of productive, efficient, and large-scale
agricultural development on unregistered customary land. See id. at 9.
244. It is notable in this regard that Indonesia does not have a comprehensive system of social
security, which means that land and local social structure are the only forms of social insurance for most
Indonesians.
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worship.245 Finally, registration as customary land would be relatively
quick, which would ameliorate the present unsatisfactory situation in which
regional bureaucracies often argue (wrongly) that the mere fact of
nonregistration means that formal title does not exist, and that the land in
question therefore has reverted to the state.
3. Register of Dealings
Although ownership would be nonalienable, an adat group registering its
land as customary land should be able to access the processes of economic
development through an accompanying register of dealings. This would record
agreements with outsiders that concern the customary land. Such agreements
should say nothing as to title, but should be binding inter partes, and should
operate as a form of notice to outsiders subsequently acquiring an interest in
the land. Thus, registered agreements should take priority over unregistered
ones, and the principle of "first in time prevails" would govern in situations
involving competing registered instruments.24 6 This system would allow
outsiders to have certainty in the indefeasibility of a registered agreement,
without incurring the conflict of adjudicating uncertain and overlapping titles.
The possibility of post-registration, intra-group disputes should also be
minimized by a requirement that there be a period of notice for any applicant
to register an agreement, and that all group claimants to the land must agree
in writing with the registered agreement.
Another condition precedent to validity of a registered agreement should
be that a local Land Court, discussed in further detail below, approve the
fairness and appropriateness of the dealing, taking into account the
consideration and the appropriateness of the development. These criteria
should also be applied to determine whether an agreement should be registered
if a group claimant were to refuse to consent to the agreement. Unrecorded
agreements entered into prior to establishment of the register would also only
be enforceable if they satisfied a similar test of fairness and appropriateness.
Finally, a special security should be developed to allow for a specified section
of the customary land to be leased in the event of default. 247
4. Registration of Individual Occupancy
The second choice available to an adat group should be to record
individual occupancy, but not necessarily "rights," within the group's land.
Simpson notes that this approach was effective in West Malaysia, an area with
245. A good example of the need for such registration is the recent major land dispute in Bali, in
which land traditionally within the boundaries of the Tanah Lot Temple, one of the holiest temples in Bali,
was expropriated for a tourist development. The authorities claimed that the land in question was not
within the temple's boundaries. See Hindu Students Visit Legal Aid Office, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 4, 1994,
at 3.
246. Knetsch and Trebilcock strongly argue, in the context of Papua New Guinea, that a system of
registered dealings of this kind would produce many of the benefits of registered titles without incurring
the conflict-created adjudication. See KNETSCH & TREBILCOCK, supra note 111, at 62-65.
247. See id. at 50 (discussing need for security to avoid landlessness and exploitation in customary
societies).
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similar adat to that of West Sumatra, in providing certainty over time as
occupancy evolved into an accepted right of possession.248 Transfer of
possession in this instance would simply involve an alteration of the relevant
name in the local register. Any other dealing, including the provision of
security, should have to be conducted through the register of dealings
discussed above, with the exception that in this case individual claimants
would have to agree to the dealing. This system would allow individual tenure
to evolve over time without encouraging the types of disputes notorious in
systematic registration of individualized titles in areas where communal forms
of tenure prevail. It would be preferable to proposals to introduce a system
of qualified titles in Indonesia, in which registration would be conditional for
ten years and indefeasible thereafter, because it would tend to avoid far more
the problems of corruption and disassociation of village members from title
registration that were discussed before.
5. Group Registration
The third possibility should allow the adat group to record its group title
in the name of a representative appointed in accordance with a prescribed
procedure. The representative should hold title in trust (the Indonesian
expression atas nama conveys a similar meaning) for group members. Bona
fide purchasers of an interest in the land would need only to deal with the
representative, and group members would be limited to a personal action in
damages against the representative in the event of any breach of trust by the
representative. The representative would also be required to sign a sworn
statement that any dealing concerning the land followed a process of
consensus through deliberation with community members.249
Intra-group aspects of a registered group title should be determined by the
principle of internal sovereignty discussed above. That is, the adat group
should continue to determine the content and operation of individual rights and
obligations within the adat group. This would retain the subtle and complex
processes of adat discussed earlier in this Article, and obviate the need to
provide statutory equivalents of individual adat rights in each region.10 At
the same time, however, these intra-group rights and obligations should not
apply to outsiders who acquire interests in the group title. In this case, the
interest in question would have to correspond to, and be regulated by, formal
statutory rights of lease, use, and so forth. This approach would buttress local
social structure without detracting from the certainty required to encourage
outside investment.
248. See SIMPSON, supra note 111, at 229.
249. This is the system adopted in Nigeria. See SIMPSON, supra note 111, at232-23 (discussing role
of family representative in Registered Land Act of 1965).
250. Another flaw in the World Bank's proposals is that they do not provide for the myriad of
different adat rights in each region. This breaches the principle that effective title registration should
reflect tenure rather than alter it.
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6. Individualized Titles
Finally, the adat group could choose at any time to partition the land
among its members, with each one then holding individual, registered titles.
This would allow for any natural process of individualization in adat to be
reflected in formal law. In addition, in those areas, such as Java and most
urban areas, where there is no true adat "group," individual titles would be
the only option. In order to avoid the problems with corruption and injustice
in the present process of land registration, a representative from the Land
Court, and not a state-appointed committee, should undertake the process of
adjudication. When disputes arose, and there were no adat group from which
resolution could be sought at first instance, the preliminary fact of occupancy
should be recorded, with a subsequent adjudication of title by the Land Court.
Community spirit and amenities should be protected though an effective
system of zoned land use. Finally, all titles, whether group or individual,
would not be indefeasible, and transactional formalities should be kept to a
minimum so that the registry could continue to reflect reality.
Unlawful occupiers should be granted title in cases in which the true
owner had made no attempt to enforce his, her, or its interests for seven
years. This would be consistent with studies that show that granting title to
squatters minimizes disputes and encourages greater efficiency and investment
in land use."5 It appears to be the only practicable way to deal with the
huge numbers of unlawful occupiers in contemporary Indonesia.
D. Dispute Resolution and the Land Court
Of course, none of these proposals could work without an effective
system of dispute resolution. To this end, a separate Land Court should be
established in Indonesia. The rationale for such a court is the lack of
confidence in the general court system, as well as the early success and
independence of such separate institutions as the National Commission for
Human Rights and the new Administrative Court. 52 The Land Court should
be empowered to resolve all disputes involving land, including those internal
to adat groups. In these cases, however, the court should first attend as an
observer and recorder while the parties seek to resolve the dispute through
traditional means of discussion and consensus. A recorded agreement should
be enforceable by Land Court procedures. If this approach proves ineffective,
251. See Burns, supra note 118, at 13 (discussing Thai land policy).
252. The government-established National Commission for Human Rights has produced a number
of reports that are highly critical of the government, most recently in relation to riots after the disbanding
of opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri's headquarters in Jakarta. On this highly sensitive political
matter, the Commission reported, contrary to the government's version, that the storming of the
headquarters had not been conducted by an opposition faction disgruntled with Sukarnoputri, but by a
paramilitary force that had been trained in secret for this purpose for some time. See, e.g., More Megawati
Supporters Go on Trial, JAKARTA POST, Oct. 15, 1996, at 3.
The Administrative Court has also revealed its independence by holding that the 1996 closure of a
number of magazines critical of the government had not been carried out in accordance with statutory
procedures. Notably, however, this decision was overturned on appeal by the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Supreme Court Under Fire over 'Tempo' Verdict, JAKARTA POST, June 14, 1996, at 2.
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and at least one of the parties wishes the matter to proceed further, a more
formal process of mediation should be adopted with relevant local adat
principles being applied. Again failing resolution, the court should make and
record a formal determination. When an outsider, including the state, is a
party to a dispute with an adat group, the outsider should lodge a compliance
bond that would be lost in the event of noncompliance with any Land Court
order. As stated above, Land Court judges should also supervise adat groups'
dealings with outsiders.
Finally, the possibility of corruption in the local Land Court can be
diminished but not discounted. The best way to minimize this possibility is to
provide high salaries for judges, a clear set of principles and rules governing
the determination of land disputes, and a system of reporting leading
judgments. In addition to a statement that adat rules should be applied
whenever possible, the set of principles should give clear guidelines on two
other matters. First, it should define the adat principle of consensus through
discussion and deliberation. For example, discussion and deliberation should
mean that every adult group member has been consulted, and that consensus
does not exist when a significant number of members disagree. In addition,
the principles should state clearly that appeals from the Land Court to the
Supreme Court are on matters of law only; that this means that findings of
fact cannot be overturned unless reached through an error of law; that the
concepts of social function and development cannot override legislative
requirements; and that the Chief Justice's power of "review" can only be
exercised when new evidence reveals a gross miscarriage of justice.
V. CONCLUSION
The BAL is a centerpiece of the Indonesian government's efforts at legal
unification. Yet, thirty-six years after its passage, it has spectacularly failed
to achieve its objectives of legal unity and certainty. The immediate lesson of
this failure seems to be that the BAL's syncretic approach to legal unification,
in which purportedly universal adat principles are incorporated into Western-
style statutory law, is impossible in the context of modern Indonesia,
particularly when the judiciary and adat communities are subordinate to the
state's drive for economic development. Another implication-one with great
significance for the legal unification debate-is that the regional variations in
Indonesian adat are such that the whole notion of universal adat principles
lacks sufficient precision or substance to form the foundation for unified
national law. For both of these reasons, this Article argues that adat authority,
not vague and ill-defined adat principles, must be the basis of modern
Indonesian law reform. This will require, as a starting point, that formal law
recognize the internal sovereignty of adat groups and create graduated
mechanisms by which those groups can participate appropriately in the process
of development. The alternative is that Indonesia will truly become, as Von
Vollenhoven warned, an inequitable and conflict-ridden "museum of
adat. "253
253. See Bums, supra note 24, at 42 n.58.
